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No one ever looks forward to entering a nursing home because it means 
leaving the things most dear to them: family, home, and independence.  
Nevertheless, without the current nursing home system,2 many elderly and 
disabled persons, who require comprehensive treatment, would not have access to 
necessary care.3  A viable nursing home industry is essential to our health care 
system, and regulations need to carefully balance public health and safety 
concerns against concern for the operational viability of the sector.4  This balance 
has been disrupted by the abrogation of nursing home Due Process rights when in 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”). While the 
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 Three main parties fund nursing homes: Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
parties.  Of the payments received by nursing homes in 2001, Medicare accounted for 
11.3%, Medicaid for 67%, and private payors were responsible for 38.9%.  See TABLE 
13: Nursing Home Care Expenditures Aggregate and per Capita Amount, Percent 
Distribution and Average Annual Percent Change by Source of Funds: Selected 
Calendar Years 1980-2012, HCFA, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-
2002 (last visited Mar. 21, 2004).  Medicare spending on nursing home care totaled $9.5 
billion in 2000 and $11.6 billion in 2001.  Id.  
3 THE HONORABLE JOHN B. BREAUX, THE HONORABLE LARRY E. CRAIG, AND 
THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, STAFF OF GEN. ACCT. OFF., 107TH CONG., 
REPORT ON NURSING HOME EXPENDITURES AND QUALITY 3 (Comm. Print 2002).  In 
2000, nursing homes provided care to 1.6 million elderly and disabled persons 
and by 2050 nursing homes are projected to provide care to 6.6 million elderly 
and disabled persons.  See TABLE 13: Nursing Home Care Expenditures Aggregate and 
per Capita Amount, Percent Distribution and Average Annual Percent Change by Source 
of Funds: Selected Calendar Years 1980-2012, HCFA, supra note 2.
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 133 CONG. REC. S5714-02 (1987).  Providing care for the elderly in nursing 
homes is an enormous cost that “bankrupt all but the wealthiest nursing homes.  Id.  In 
1987, the General Accounting Office reported that the federal government had not 
fulfilled its statutory assurances of reimbursing nursing homes at a level to provide high 
quality care.  Id.
2Constitution,5 the Social Security Act,6 and Medicare regulations7 mandate that 
nursing homes be afforded Due Process rights when challenging noncompliance 
findings, HHS has unduly restricted nursing homes’ rights by denying them 
access to Medicare8 compliance hearings.  
Congress tried to standardize the requirements of Due Process of law 
among federal administrative agency’s with the passage of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”).9  Section 554 of the APA grants individuals a hearing on 
the record to challenge the deprivation of liberty or property,10 while sections 702 
and 704 guarantee individuals the right to appeal an agency’s findings to federal 
court.11  These rights to a hearing remain subordinate to each agency’s governing 
statute,12 which often limit the structure of the hearing process and the right to 
federal review.13
For instance, section 1320a-7a(c)(2) of the Social Security Act mandates 
that HHS provide nursing homes with a hearing on the record to appeal findings 
of alleged noncompliance with the Medicare regulations.14  Access to agency 
5
 U.S. Cons. Amend. V and XIV.  
6
 The Medicare Act is a section of the Social Security Act.  See Title 18 of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395.  The hearing requirements and limitations 
concerning nursing homes are found both in the Social Security Act and the Medicare 
Act.  Therefore, throughout the article both the Social Security Act and the Medicare Act 
are discussed.
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 Medicare is a federal entitlement program to pay for health insurance for the 
elderly and disabled.  See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE 
IN NURSING HOMES, App. A (1986) [hereinafter IOM Report]; also PETER A. CORNING, 
THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICARE: FROM IDEA TO LAW, App. A (1969).  This article will 
primarily focus on issues relating to the Medicare Act because federal regulation of 
nursing homes takes place almost exclusively under Medicare.  Even though nursing 
homes are similarly regulated under the Medicaid Act, each state administers its own 
Medicaid program based on distinct rules promulgated and implemented by that 
individual state.  The federal government does provide guidance regarding Medicaid 
regulation; however, the federal government does not actively supervise the activities of 
regulating nursing homes other than in budgetary matters.  Medicaid will only be 
discussed as it pertains to changes in the Medicare program.
9
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 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
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 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (1994).
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13 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 
(1999) (The Court ruled that the exclusive clause of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) barred federal review of claims and 
causes originating from the Attorney General’s action to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.)
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3review is limited by Section 1320a-7a(j)(1), which incorporates sections 405(g) 
and (h), that prohibits federal review of a case until HHS reviews the case and 
issues a final ruling.15  HHS has further limited the Medicare compliance hearing 
process by denying nursing homes the right to challenge findings of 
noncompliance,16 even though the findings are used against them in future 
proceedings to deprive the nursing home of property, such as Medicare 
payments.17  This denial of nursing homes’ Due Process rights in administrative 
hearing is significant because it is emblematic of the Federal administrative 
agency system18 that was upheld by the Supreme Court’s decision in the case 
styled as Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc. [hereinafter Ill. 
Council].19
In Ill. Council, the Illinois Council on Long Term Care (“Council”)20
argued that the statutory provisions that barred nursing homes from bringing a 
case in federal court until they had exhausted their administrative remedies, 
effectively denying nursing homes Due Process.21  The Council averred that as a 
practical matter it was impossible to exhaust their administrative remedies, and 
thus negated their ability to seek federal review for procedural and Constitutional 
issues.22  In response, the Secretary of HHS23 (“Secretary”) asserted that nursing 
homes were afforded the right to procedural Due Process protections, which 
included “the right of any dissatisfied nursing home to a full evidentiary hearing
15
 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) (2004).
16
 ALJs summarily dismiss nursing home appeals in Medicare noncompliance 
cases when HHS has not imposed a remedy.  See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 
(1996), aff’d DAB No. 1607 (1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 
(1999); Heritage Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (2000); Lutheran Home –
Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza 
Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge 
Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); 
Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CR1104 (2003); Manorcare Health Services Sandia, 
DAB No. CR1255 (2004).
17
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 Recently there have been many actions challenging the denial of Due Process 
rights in agency hearing conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Services.  See
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); also
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
19 Shalala v. Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1 (2000). 
[hereinafter Ill. Council]
20
 The Illinois Council on Long Term Care, incorporated under the laws of 
Illinois, is an association of approximately two hundred nursing homes doing business in 
Illinois.  See Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347, at *1 (N.D.Ill. 1997).  
21 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 20-3 (2000).
22 Id. at 20. 
23
 At the time of the case the Secretary of Health and Human Services, hereafter 
referred as the Secretary, was Donna Shalala.  
4to challenge any findings of noncompliance.”24 The Supreme Court ruled that 
nursing homes were barred from seeking federal review of a case until they had 
presented their case to HHS and received a final ruling, even if the claims were 
based on Constitutional issues.25
Notwithstanding the assertions made in Ill. Council, HHS has whittled 
away the very procedural Due Process rights that the Court relied upon in its 
ruling in Ill. Council.  Since Ill. Council, the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”) 
have consistently ruled, and the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”)26 has 
affirmed, that if HHS fails to impose or rescinds the remedies imposed for a 
nursing home’s alleged noncompliance, nursing homes do not have a right to a
hearing even though the findings of noncompliance are not rescinded,27 nor 
removed from the HHS website,28 and are the basis for the imposition of remedies 
for future incidents of noncompliance.29  In fact, this proposition was codified in 
the Code of Federal Regulations in 1996, four years before the Supreme Court 
heard and issued it’s ruling in Ill. Council.30  Many of the ALJs have drastically 
reduced the full evidentiary hearing process31 to direct testimony through 
submission of affidavit and in-person cross-examination of witnesses.32
As a result of these changes, nursing homes have been left without an 
opportunity to be heard in the agency proceeding and in federal court before the 
loss of their property, namely Medicare payments.33  This contravenes the letter 
and spirit of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment that guarantees a 
right to process for the loss of property.  In order to comply with traditional 
notions of procedural Due Process required by the Constitution, the Social 
Security Act, the Medicare regulations, and the APA, I argue that HHS must 
provide nursing homes with hearing rights in all cases and allow them to bypass 
24 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
25 Id. at 23.
26
 The Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”) is the appellate branch of HHS’ 
hearing division.  See 42 C.F.R. § 498.80 (2004).  The Board is made up of three ALJs: 
Chief ALJ Ford, Ballard, and Garrett.
27 See 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12) (2004) (this section was redesignated as § 
498.3(b)(13) in 2001.  See 65 Fed. Reg. 18549 (Apr. 7, 2000)).  
28 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 22 (2000). 
29 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(c)(2), 488.438(f)(1) and (3) (2004).
30 See 61 Fed. Reg. 32347 (June 24, 1996) (codified as 42 C.F.R. §431.153(b)
(2003)).
31
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-66 (2004).
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 No federal court has ruled that Medicare payments constitute property; 
however, most courts ignore this issue and simply review the merits of the case.  See
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Bowen v. 
Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986); Jordan Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 
276 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 2002).
5the administrative system if the only challenge concerns Constitutional or 
statutory procedures.
This article will examine the failure of HHS to provide nursing homes 
with procedural Due Process rights by analyzing the Supreme Court decision in 
Ill. Council.  Section II will briefly trace the history of Due Process in HHS 
hearings.  The evolution of the survey and certification of nursing homes and the 
Due Process rights granted by HHS in nursing home hearings is discussed in 
Section III.  Section IV reviews the pivotal case of Ill. Council, which barred 
nursing homes’ access to federal courts to challenge the Constitutionality of HHS’ 
actions, while the problems with the case and possible solutions to rectify these 
problems are addressed in Section V.
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF DUE PROCESS IN HHS HEARINGS
The cornerstone of the American justice system, the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, guarantees that no person will 
“be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”34
Unfortunately, individuals are not always granted these Due Process rights when 
challenging the deprivation of liberty or property by Federal administrative 
agencies.35  The abrogation of these protections during Federal administrative 
Agency adjudications has created an eternal tension between the agencies, the 
individuals regulated by the agencies, and the federal courts.  This tension 
pervades the lives of every individual and business as Federal administrative 
agencies, such as HHS,36 govern vital aspects of all daily living.  
The two major events concerning Due Process in HHS administrative 
hearings were: the passage of the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 and the 
Supreme Court’s decisions discussing the Social Security Act and Medicare’s bar 
to federal review.37  Each of these actions constituted either an expansion or 
constriction of Due Process rights in HHS that have profoundly affected the Due 
Process rights of nursing homes.
34 U.S. CONS. AMEND. V and XIV.  Based on the Supreme Court case of Santa 
Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), businesses (i.e. corporations) are 
considered persons under the law and thus are guaranteed due process under the law.
35
 Richard J. Pierce, Jr. The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1973 (1996). 
36
 The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was renamed the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) in 1980. See Department of 
Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(e), 93 Stat. 695 (1979) 
(codified as 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (2000)).  For simplicity and continuity, this article refers to 
the agency only as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
37 Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); 
Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Bowen, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
6A. The Administrative Procedure Act – Fairness in Administrative 
Agency hearings.
As early as the 1920s, Congress began delegating broad powers to Federal 
administrative agencies to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public, but 
the Supreme Court regularly overturned these delegations.38  After 1935, the 
Supreme Court upheld broad Congressional delegation of power to Federal 
administrative agencies, culminating in several cases in which the Court upheld 
delegation of power to agencies with little to no standards.39  With the 
proliferation of Federal administrative agencies, Congress became concerned with 
the potential for administrative bias in Federal administrative hearings because 
agencies were granted significant discretion in their hearing procedures.40
Because the agency served as the investigator, the prosecutor, and the judge, 
Congress questioned whether the agency could be genuinely impartial.41  There 
were a series of bills introduced in Congress in the 1930s and 1940s aimed at 
correcting the problems of administrative tribunal review.42
In 1937, President Roosevelt also became concerned with the fairness of 
the administrative review process and created the Committee on Administrative 
38 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
39 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (Court upheld broad 
delegation of power to Price Administrator to regulate commodity pricing); Lichter v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) (Court upheld statute giving the executive branch the 
power to recover profits from war contracts deemed excessive without defining what 
constituted excessive); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (Court upheld 
Congressional delegation of power to Federal Loan Bank Board to issue regulations for 
when a conservator could be appointed to take over a mismanaged federal savings and 
loan association).  The Court’s decisions in these cases, leading to the independence of 
agencies from executive, legislative, and judicial controls, solidified the place of the 
Federal administrative agency as the “fourth branch” of the federal government.  See
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (3d 
ed. 1994).
40 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1950) citing S. 5154, 70th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 1929).
41 Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. at 41-42 citing ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 
IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE 
ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT 36-37 (1937).
42
 S. 1835, 73d Cong. (1st Sess. 1933); S. 3787, H.R. 12297, 74th Cong. (2d 
Sess. 1936); S. 3676, 75th Cong. (3d Sess. 1938); H.R. 6324, H.R. 4235, H.R. 4236, S. 
915, S. 916, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939); S. 674, S. 675, S. 918, H.R. 3464, H.R. 4238, 
H.R. 4782, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941); H.R. 4314, H.R. 5081, H.R. 5237, S. 2030, 78th 
Cong. (2d Sess. 1944); H.R. 1203, S. 7, 79th Cong. (1st Sess. 1945).  
7Management.43  Two years later, the President also directed the Attorney General 
to establish a new “committee of eminent lawyers, jurists, scholars, and 
administrators to review the entire administrative process in the various 
departments of the executive Government and to recommend improvements, 
including the suggestion of any needed legislation.”44  Before the Attorney 
General’s Committee Report was issued, Congress passed the Walter-Logan bill 
that standardized the administrative review process.  The Walter-Logan bill 
provided for a standard hearing process that included a right to appeal agency 
actions in writing, a right to a hearing before a three panel board, a right to call 
witnesses and compel documents, and a right to appeal the decision of the U.S. 
Circuit Courts of Appeal.45  President Roosevelt vetoed the bill,46 acknowledging 
the need for reform, but delaying his decision until the Attorney General 
Committee’s Report was issued.47
To instill a sense of fairness and eradicate the bias and arbitrary nature of 
agency hearings, the Attorney General Committee’s Report (“the Report”) 
recommended that agencies completely separate adjudication functions and 
personnel from those investigating and prosecuting claims.48  However, in 
comparison to the Walter-Logan bill, the Report provided generalized guidelines 
for attaining these goals rather than providing specific procedures.  Congress used 
the Report to craft the bill that was later entitled the Administrative Procedure Act 
of 1946.49  Even though the broad language in the Report allowed the agency 
more flexibility in fulfilling the requirements of fairness, Congress tried to 
provide safeguards in the APA by making it clear that all agency decisions were 
reviewable by the federal courts unless Congress clearly withheld that right.  The 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated:  
Very rarely do statutes withhold judicial review. It has never been 
the policy of Congress to prevent the administration of its own 
statutes from being judicially confined to the scope of authority 
43 ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT
37 (1937).
44
 The quoted statement is from President Roosevelt's message to Congress on 
December 18, 1940, vetoing the Walter-Logan Act of 1940.  See H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. § 
3-4 (3d Sess. 1940).  
45
 86 CONG. REC. 13674 (1940).
46
 S. 915, H.R. 6324, 76th Cong. (1st Sess. 1939).  See also 86 CONG. REC. 
13942--3 (1940), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 986, 76th Cong. (3d Sess. 1940).
47
 86 CONG. REC. at 13943.
48 FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7 (1941) contained in S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 
1941).  
49
 S. REP. No. 79-752, at 26 (1945).
8granted or to the objectives specified. Its policy could not be 
otherwise, for in such a case statutes would in effect be blank 
checks drawn to the credit of some administrative officer or 
board.50
The House of Representatives Committee on Judiciary further said that 
there should be judicial review and stressed that when that review is limited the 
intent is clear.51  The APA also afforded the right to some procedural safeguards 
on the agency level once the agency’s governing statute granted hearing rights.52
Most significantly, APA §554 provided that:
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on 
the record after opportunity of an agency hearing.53
This section explicitly grants a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the 
record.  Although, Congress enacted the APA of 1946 to address issues of 
fairness in the administrative hearing process,54 these rights to a hearing remain 
subordinate to each agency’s governing statute,55 which often limits the structure 
of the hearing process and the right to federal review.56  For instance, the 
requirement of exhausting all administrative remedies before bringing a case in 
federal court only applies when provided by an agency’s governing statute.57
This is the case in hearings conducted by HHS in the long-term care arena.58  The 
Social Security Act limits the reviewability of claims in both the administrative 
agency process and in the federal courts.  Thus, after the passage of the APA, the 
main question for individuals challenging the actions of HHS under the Social 
50 Bowen, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986), citing S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945).
51
 H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980 at 41 (1946).  
52
 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
53 Id.
54
 Pub. L. No. 89-554 (Sept. 6, 1966).  See also FINAL REPORT OF THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7 (1941) 
contained in S. DOC. NO. 8, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941).  
55
 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 702, 704 (2004).
56 See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471 
(1999) (The Court ruled that the exclusive clause of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) barred federal review of claims and 
causes originating from the Attorney General’s action to commence proceedings, 
adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.)
57 Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
58 See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984); Dallas Healthcare, Inc. v. Health 
& Human Servs. Comm’n, 921 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Int’l Long Term Care, 
Inc. v. Shalala, 947 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1996); Michigan Ass’n of Homes & Service for 
the Aging, Inc. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 1997).
9Security Act was predicated on whether the agency had the right to limit federal 
review of Constitutional issues even if it meant no right to meaningful review.  
B. Can Federal Courts Review Due Process Challenges under the Social 
Security Act?
Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h), federal courts are barred from 
reviewing any Social Security action under 28 U.S.C. §§133159 and 134660 before 
HHS has issued a final ruling.  Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) states:  
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of 
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, 
irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review of 
such decision by a civil action ... Such action shall be brought in 
the district court of the United States.
(emphasis added).61  This review is further limited by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which 
says:
No findings of fact or decision of the Commissioner of Social 
Security shall be reviewed by any person, tribunal, or 
governmental agency except as herein provided. No action against 
the United States, the Commissioner of Social Security, or any 
officer or employee thereof shall be brought under section 1331 or 
1346 of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this 
subchapter.62
This bar to federal review before a final decision from the Secretary was 
incorporated into the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(c)(2) and (j)(1).63
The “exhaustion” requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) & (h) has allowed the 
Secretary to channel all claims through the agency process.  In 1975, the Supreme 
59
 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. §1331 (2004).
60
 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction concurrent, with the Federal 
Court of Claims of any civil claim against the United States for the recovery of any 
internal-revenue tax or any other civil action or claim against the United States, not 
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied 
contract with the United States.”  28 U.S.C. §§1346 (2004).
61
 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g) (2004).
62
 42 U.S.C. § 405 (h) (2004).
63
 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(1), nursing homes are granted a right to a 
hearing.  These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2), which makes 42 
U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) & (h) applicable to nursing home hearings.
10
Court decided a case entitled Weinberger v. Salfi,64 establishing a broad rule 
barring all claims arising under the Social Security Act regardless of whether they 
involved Constitutional or statutory challenges.  In Salfi, a class action suit was 
brought in federal district court challenging HHS’ denial of Social Security 
benefits because of the duration of relationship requirement.65  According to the 
duration requirement, the surviving spouse must have been married to the 
deceased worker for at least nine months before the death of the worker to receive 
Social Security benefits.66  The class represented both members that had been 
denied and those that had not yet submitted claims for benefits.67  The class 
asserted that the duration requirement was unconstitutional based on the Equal 
Protection Clause, and requested the immediate payment of benefits.68  Even 
though, neither party raised the issue of jurisdiction nor did the resolution of 
jurisdiction issue resolve the entire case, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction over the members of the class that had not 
presented their case to HHS.69  Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), federal review was 
barred until two steps had been completed: the case had first been presented to the 
agency and the Secretary had issued a final ruling.70
The complaints argued that the section was merely an exhaustion 
requirement.71  Courts usually require exhaustion “as a matter of preventing 
premature interference with agency processes, so that the agency may function 
efficiently and so that it may have an opportunity to correct its own errors, to 
afford the parties and the courts the benefit of its experience and expertise, and to 
compile a record which is adequate for judicial review.”72  The complaints argued 
64 Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
65 Id. at 754.
66
 Pub. L. No. 90-248 §§ 156(a) & (b), 81 Stat. 866 (1967) (codified as 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 416(c)(5) & (e)(2) (1970)).
67 Salfi, 422 U.S. at 755.  
68 Id.  The United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
ruled for the class and granted declaratory and injunctive relief.  Id.
69 Id. at 787.  The dissent, written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice 
Marshall, pointed out the fact that the jurisdictional issue was not raised by either party, 
was only discussed in passing in the oral arguments, and did not resolve the entire case.  
Id. at 787-89.  Thus, the Court should not have discussed the jurisdiction issue.  Id. at 
789.
70 Id. at. 756.  
71
 Furthermore, the dissent contended that the channeling provision of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 405(h) was merely an exhaustion requirement for questions of fact and statutory 
interpretation.  Id. at 789.  To support this contention, Justice Brennan cited to the 
legislative history when the amendment was passed and the Social Security Board’s 
discussion of the statute immediately after is passage.  Id. at 790-792.  
72 Id. at 765.  The two relevant exceptions to the exhaustion requirement in this 
case are: futility of review and irreparable harm.  Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 
U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967); McKart v. U.S., 395 U.S. 185, 197-201 (1969).
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that completing the agency process was futile because the issue of 
Constitutionality is outside the scope of the Secretary’s authority.73  The Supreme 
Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was not a mere exhaustion requirement, but 
that the federal review bar prohibited all federal review save for those actions 
mentioned in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).74  The Court announced that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
was not limited to mere decisions of fact or law, but also applied to any action 
seeking to recover under the Social Security Act including Constitutional 
questions.75
Therefore, according to the Court, even Constitutional claims must first be 
brought to the agency, so that the Secretary may determine if the claims can be 
resolved under the Social Security Act.76  Because the members of the class were 
seeking payment of Social Security benefits, their claims arose under the Act and 
were not reviewable until the claims were first presented to HHS and the 
Secretary issued a final ruling.77  Nevertheless, the members of the claim that had 
presented their case to HHS were not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), so the court 
went on to address the substantive issue of the complaint.78  The Supreme Court’s 
decision to impose the subject matter jurisdiction requirement for all cases arising 
under the Social Security Act regardless of the content of the claim seemingly cut 
off Social Security claimants’ access to the federal courts, but this was not the 
case in Matthews v. Eldridge.79
The Supreme Court allowed the Social Security recipient in Eldridge to 
bring a claim in federal court challenging the Constitutionality of the procedures 
afforded in a Social Security hearing even though he had not fulfilled the subject 
matter jurisdiction requirements of announced in Salfi.  In Eldridge, Mr. Eldridge 
challenged the Secretary’s decision to revoke his Social Security disability 
benefits prior to providing an evidentiary hearing.80  Eldridge received a letter 
from the state agency administering Social Security benefits that his disability had 
ceased and thus his payments would be terminated.81  Eldridge responded to the 
agency in writing disputing the characterization of his medical condition.82  The 
state agency reviewed his response, but issued a final determination that 
73 Salfi, 422 U.S. at 765.
74 Id. at 758.
75 Id. at 762.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 785.  The dissent also asserted that the case did not arise under the Social 
Security Act.  Instead, the claim arose under the Equal Protection Clause, a Constitutional 
matter.  Id. at 795.  
78 Id. at 797.
79 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  
80 Id.
81 Id. at 324. 
82 Id.
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Eldridge’s disability had ceased.83  HHS accepted the state’s determination and 
sent a letter to Eldridge stating that his benefits would be cancelled in July and 
granted him appeal rights.84  Instead of appealing the determination, Eldridge 
filed suit in federal court challenging the Constitutionality of HHS’ practice of 
granting only a post-termination hearing to appeal the termination of disability 
benefits rather than a pre-termination hearing.  He also requested immediate 
reinstatement of his benefits pending such a hearing.85  The Secretary moved for 
dismissal based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Salfi that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
required Eldridge to present the case to HHS and receive a final ruling before 
federal review.86
The Supreme Court ruled that Eldridge’s letter to the state disputing the 
characterization of his medical condition fulfilled the “present requirement” of 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h), even though Eldridge did not raise any Constitutional question in 
his letter.87  This was not fatal to his claim because 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) only 
required a final decision on the issues relating to the Social Security Act, not that 
all issues be presented to HHS.88  The Court also found that the finality 
requirement was waivable and waived the requirement because Eldridge’s case 
was so significant “that deference to the agency’s judgment is inappropriate.”89
Furthermore, Eldridge’s Constitutional claims were collateral to his claim for 
future Social Security benefits.  The Court reasoned that Eldridge’s claim 
regarding the timing of the benefits hearing under the Social Security Act did not 
arise under the Social Security Act because without this review Eldridge’s 
Constitutional claim would never be addressed.90  Hence, the Court seemingly 
created an exception for Eldridge that if 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) would serve to bar 
federal review, then the case could be filed in federal court after presentment to 
agency.  The Court’s decision in Eldridge was a major shift from its decision in 
Salfi barring federal review until both steps were fulfilled.  The exception applied 
in Eldridge was a mere aberration illustrated by the Court’s subsequent decisions 
that returned to the strict requirements set forth in Salfi requiring presentment and 
a final agency decision before allowing federal review of an agency’s action.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 324-325.  The district court found that HHS’ procedures violated 
Eldridge’s Due Process rights because the hearing was a post-termination hearing rather 
than a pre-termination hearing that would ensure the uninterrupted payment of benefits to 
Eldridge.  Id. at 326.
86 Id. at 325.
87 Id. at 329.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 330.
90 Id. at 331.
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In Heckler v. Ringer,91 four Medicare recipients brought an action in 
federal court based on federal question jurisdiction challenging the disallowance 
of benefits to cover a surgical procedure to relieve respiratory distress.92
Medicare patients seeking reimbursement for the procedure were awarded money 
to cover their surgery costs until 1980 when HHS issued a formal administrative 
ruling prohibiting reimbursement for the surgery.93  Three of the four claimants 
had already had the surgery before 1980 and were seeking reimbursement, while 
Ringer, the fourth claimant, could not afford the surgery and was seeking money 
to undergo surgery. 94  Each claimant was at a different stage in the appeal 
process, but none of the claimants had received a final ruling from the Secretary.95
The Supreme Court dismissed three of the claimants’ cases because they had their 
surgery before the Secretary issued the administrative ruling and were not barred 
from reimbursement.96
The only remaining claimant, Ringer, had requested payment from HHS, 
but the Secretary was unwilling to issue a ruling in his case until he underwent the 
surgery.  Ringer had not undergone the surgery because he was indigent and was 
seeking a judgment to obtain the money necessary for the surgery.  In response to 
Ringer’s case, the Court ruled that section 405(h) applied to his claim because 
although he maintained that the administrative ruling was unconstitutional, he was 
still seeking reimbursement of the award of benefits under the Medicare Act.97
Thus, his claims arose under the Medicare Act.98  According to the Court, 
regardless of whether his claim challenged the procedures of HHS or the 
substance of HHS’ actions, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) barred federal courts from ruling 
on these claims, if they arose under the Medicare Act, until a final action from the 
Secretary.99
91 Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
92 Id. at 605.  Their claims were dismissed by the Untied States District Court for 
the Central District of California for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and reinstated by 
the United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
93
 Medicare Program, 45 Fed. Reg. 71426-71427 (1980). (Because of the lack of 
acceptance by the medical community over the effectiveness of the surgery, the Secretary 
issued an administrative instruction to all fiscal intermediaries and ALJs that no payment 
is to be made for Medicare claims for the surgical procedure to relive respiratory distress.  
Ringer, 466 U.S. at 607).
94 Ringer, 466 U.S. at 609.
95 Id. at 610.
96 Id.
97
 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(c)(1), nursing homes are granted a right to a 
hearing.  These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2), which makes 42 
U.S.C. §§ 405 (g) & (h) applicable to nursing home hearings.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 615.  
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Even though the Secretary had drafted an exception to the subject matter 
jurisdiction requirement to allow cases to go to federal court after the 
reconsideration stage “when the only factor precluding award of benefits is a 
statutory provision which the claimant challenges as unconstitutional,”100 the 
Court ruled that the exception did not apply in this case because the Constitutional
claims were inextricably linked with their benefits claims.101  Furthermore, the 
Court ruled that the claimant seeking money to have the surgery still had an 
avenue of review even if there was a presumption against reimbursement.  Thus, 
Ringer’s case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Effectively, 
this left Ringer with no avenue for review because he had no right to agency 
review until after he underwent the surgery, which he could not afford to have.102
Although the Court’s decision in Ringer left him with no meaningful review, the 
Court did not allow this as an exception to section 405(h) until its decision in 
Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians.103
In Bowen, an association of family physicians filed a lawsuit challenging 
the validity of a HHS regulation permitting lower payments for similar services 
based on the type of physician providing the care.104  The Secretary argued that 
Congress had prohibited any federal review of amount determinations under 
Medicare Part B.105  According to the Secretary, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only granted 
hearing rights to those under Medicare Part A and 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) precluded 
all administrative and judicial review of claims not noted in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  
The Supreme Court ruled that the legislative history of the APA proved 
otherwise.  Specifically, the Senate and House Judiciary Committee Report stated 
that there is a presumption of review unless explicitly stated.106  Moreover, the 
legislative history from 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), (h) confined all amount 
determinations solely to the agency “to avoid overloading the courts with quite 
minor affairs.”107  Therefore, the Court ruled because Congress neither granted 
100 Id. at 611, 614.  
101 Id.
102
 The dissent, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Brennan and 
Marshall, agreed with the court’s decision concerning the three claimants that had the 
surgery before 1980.  Id. at 628.  However, the dissent reiterated their argument from 
Salfi that Ringer was not barred by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) because his claim arose under the 
Constitution not the Medicare Act.  Id. at 630.  Moreover, the dissent asserted that Ringer 
had no other avenue for review because the Secretary refused to issue a ruling on his case 
until he actually had the surgery, which he was unable to afford.  Id. at 630-631.  Thus, 
until he raised the money to have the surgery he was prohibited for bring any agency 
action or federal claim to challenge the denial of payment.  Id. at 629.  
103 Bowen, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 669.
106
 H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 41 (1946).  S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945).
107 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 677 (1986) citing 118 CONG. REC. 33992 (1972).
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HHS the authority to review all other claims nor clearly prohibited federal review 
of these issues, the physicians’ claims regarding the Constitutionality of the 
regulations was reviewable.  Finally, the physicians did not have to present the 
claim to HHS or wait until the Secretary issued a final ruling as required by Salfi
and Ringer because in this instance there was no agency hearing process, so the 
only means of review was federal review.  
The Court ruled that Congress rarely withholds judicial review and it is 
questionable whether Congress can prohibit any federal review of issues 
concerning Constitutional questions.108  The Court’s decision in Bowen that 
Congress did not intend to prevent federal review harkens back to the principles 
espoused by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary when discussing the APA.  
Nevertheless, the Court’s decisions in Salfi and Ringer showed that if HHS 
provided any means by which individuals could obtain agency review, the 
requirements of section 405(h) had to be fulfilled before submitting the case for 
federal review.  HHS stretched the limitations of the Supreme Court’s rulings 
when it implemented a strict Medicare regulatory scheme to regulate nursing 
homes in 1995, which on paper provides agency review, but in reality forecloses 
agency and federal review.  
III. HISTORY OF THE MEDICARE NURSING HOME HEARING 
PROCESS GOVERNED BY HHS
The principal health care program funded and directly administered by 
HHS is the Health Insurance for the Elderly and Disabled program, better known 
as Medicare.109  Medicare consists of three parts that pay for sundry care for the 
elderly: Part A (Hospital Insurance), Part B (Supplemental Medical Insurance), 
and Part C (Medicare Managed Care).110  Part A covers nursing home care for 
persons over the age of 65, if residence at a nursing home follows within 30 days 
108 Bowen, 472 U.S. at 681, fn12.
109 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2004).  Initially, the Office of 
Nursing Home Affairs, a division of HHS, administered Medicare.  INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE IN NURSING HOMES, 244 (App. A) (1986) 
[hereinafter IOM Report].  In 1977, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
formerly known as the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), was created to 
administer and regulate Medicare.  See Pub. L. No. 95-135, 91 Stat. 1166 (1977); 66 Fed. 
Reg. 35,437-03 (July 5, 2001).  This article refers to the agency as HCFA when referring 
to specific cases, otherwise the agency will be referred to as HHS to prevent any 
confusion.
110 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395j, 1395w-21 (2004).  
Medicare covers up to 100 days of care received at a nursing home.  See Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c (2004).  However, Part A does not cover any nursing home 
services if the patient who requires skilled nursing or skilled rehabilitation services can 
receive these services on an outpatient basis.
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of a hospitalization of three or more days, and is certified as medically 
necessary.111  Medicare covers up to 100 days of care received at a nursing 
home.112  Nursing homes are subject to Medicare regulations as a result of their 
receipt of Medicare funds.  
To participate in the Medicare program, nursing homes must submit to a 
certification process, which includes a thorough inspection of the facility and 
patients to ensure that they comply with the Medicare regulations.113  Once the 
nursing home is certified to participate in Medicare, HHS contracts with State 
health agencies114 to conduct annual re-certification inspections of each Medicare 
certified nursing home.115  This re-certification process is called survey and 
certification.116  HHS aggressively regulates the nursing home industry through its 
survey and certification process, citing nursing homes for noncompliance with the 
Medicare regulations.117  The federal nursing home survey and certification 
process under Medicare has changed substantially since its advent in 1965.118
The most significant changes occurred with the passage of the Nursing Home 
Reform Act, a part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987.119  The Nursing 
Home Reform Act not only changed the survey and certification regulations, but 
it also altered the structure of the hearing process used by nursing homes to 
challenge the survey findings.
A. The Evolution of Survey and Certification Regulations Used to Police Nursing 
Homes
Since the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935, the federal 
government has been providing funding to nursing homes, but federal regulation 
111 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c (2004); History of Medicare and 
Medicaid, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/about/history/ssachr.asp (last modified 
Sept. 16, 2004).  
112 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c (2004).  However, Part A does 
not cover any nursing home services if the patient who requires skilled nursing or skilled 
rehabilitation services can receive these services on an outpatient basis.
113 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.3(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3) (2004).
114
 The State agency in Illinois responsible for conducting surveys of nursing 
homes is the Illinois Department of Public Health.  See 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 45/1-
109, 45/3-212 (2004).
115
 Survey Frequency, 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(a) (2004).
116
 Survey & Certification of Long-Term Care Facilities, 42 C.F.R. § 488, 
Subpart E (2004).
117 See HHS Fact Sheet, Assuring quality care for nursing home residents, 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=384 (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2004).  
118
 Institute of Medicine, Improving the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes, 238 
(App. A) (1986).
119
 Pub. L. No. 100-203 §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 1107 (1987).
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of the care provided by nursing homes did not begin until the passage of the 
Medicare and Medicaid Acts in 1965.  Throughout the 1970s, HHS monitored the 
capacity of nursing homes to provide quality care, but it did not monitor whether 
the nursing home was actually providing quality care until the 1980s.120  In 1987, 
Congress passed a set of quality of care standards, which are still in effect, that 
authorized HHS to aggressively police nursing homes.  
1. Certification of Nursing Homes under Medicare prior to 1987. – In 
1965, Congress enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Acts121 increasing federal 
funding to nursing homes.122  Medicare funded care provided in “extended care 
facilities” (“ECFs”) while skilled nursing services were funded under 
Medicaid.123  To participate in either Medicare or Medicaid a facility had to meet 
certain health and safety standards.  Initially, the Medicare standards were so 
severe that only about ten percent of the 6,000 nursing homes that applied to 
participate in the program achieved full compliance.124  Another fifty percent 
were allowed to participate in the program for being in “substantial compliance” 
with the Medicare standards.125  Therefore, the purpose of the first nursing home 
enforcement standards:
was to allow some substandard facilities to participate in the 
[Medicare] program while encouraging them to achieve 
compliance, rather than to bar such facilities until they were in 
compliance.126
Congress amended the Medicare program in 1967 creating less rigorous 
regulatory standards of participation and established intermediate care facilities 
(“ICFs”) under Medicaid.127 The establishment of ICFs allowed nursing homes 
that could not meet the ECF standards of Medicare or the skilled nursing services 
120 See HHS Fact Sheet, Assuring quality care for nursing home residents, 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=384 (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2004); also IOM Report, supra note 7, at 15.
121
 Medicaid is also a federally funded program; however, the States administer 
this program.  See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2004).  
122
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 240.  
123 Id. at 241. Extended care facilities paid for care for patients needing post-
hospital treatment below the level of skilled nursing care.  Id.  
124 Id. at 242.
125 Id. at 148, 233, citing Senate Comm. On Finance, 91st Cong. Report on 
Medicare and Medicaid: Problems, Issues, and Alternatives. 
126
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 148.
127 Id.  These regulations were first published in 1968 and revised in 1969.  See 
33 Fed. Reg. 12925 (Sept. 12, 1968); 34 Fed. Reg. 9782-9784 (June 24, 1969).
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standards of Medicaid to receive federal funding.128  Without these changes 
people who needed nursing care would have been left with no option for care.129
Nevertheless, even with these changes many nursing homes still were unable to 
fulfill the requirements of Medicare or Medicaid.130
Due to nationally reported incidents of nursing home quality problems, the 
Senate Finance Committee chaired by Senator Frank Moss began a series of 
hearings and studies of nursing home quality from 1969 to 1973, which affected 
both Medicare and Medicaid. 131  In 1971, as the Finance Committee was studying 
nursing home quality, President Nixon made several speeches on the deplorable 
conditions of nursing homes.  During one speech in particular at a New 
Hampshire nursing home, Nixon announced an eight-point plan to improve 
regulation of nursing homes.132  Subsequently, Congress made several of Nixon’s 
points into law, including “full federal funding of survey and certification 
activities, redefined Medicare ECFs and Medicaid SNFs into ‘skilled nursing 
facilities’ (“SNFs”), and directed [HHS] to develop a single set of standards for 
Medicare and Medicaid SNFs.”133  Passed in 1972, the law also created a new 
HHS division, the Office of Nursing Home Affairs, to conduct a “comprehensive 
study” of federal policies concerning long-term care and to coordinate 
enforcement efforts.134  The final survey and certification regulations were 
promulgated in 1974.135
According to the experts, even though these regulations were heralded by 
many for trying to address quality of care problems in nursing homes, the 
regulations did little to rectify the problems for two reasons: lack of sanctioning 
128 Id.
129 STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE STUDY OF MEDICAID
140 (The Free Press, 1940).
130
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 243.  
131 Id. at 242-243.
132 Id. at 243.  See also, STEVENS, supra note at 123, at 255 citing MSA Medicaid 
(newsletter).  
133
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 244.  These points were a part of Nixon’s 
welfare reform bill.  Id.
134 Id.
135
 39 Fed. Reg. 2238-2257 (Jan. 17, 1974). Under these regulations, HHS 
created an office in the federal regional offices to regulate and oversee state enforcement 
efforts of all long-term care facilities.  IOM Report, supra note 7, at 245 citing HHS, 
Public Health Services, Office of Long Term Care, Five Years of Accomplishments of 
the Office of Long Term Care 1971-1976 (Oct. 1976).  Nevertheless, many states chose 
not to implement or enforce these regulations.  See IOM Study on Nursing Home 
Regulation Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & 
Environment with Select Committee on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care 
House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 99th Congress 9 (1986); also IOM Report, supra 
note 7, at 244-245.
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power given to the states and failure to survey the patient’s actual condition.136  If 
a facility was found in violation of the regulations, HHS required the states to try 
to resolve the case before reporting the problem to HHS or the police.137  To 
resolve the case, states were mandated to send a notice of the violations to the 
facility and give the facility a 30 to 60 day grace period to correct the violation.138
Once the facility failed to reach compliance by the end of that time period, then 
and only then, could the state impose the sanction of termination.139
Furthermore, HHS focused its regulation of nursing homes on the 
facility’s ability to provide required services to residents in the facility, not the 
quality of the services provided.140  Several efforts were made by HHS to redirect 
the focus of the certification to quality of care by developing a patient oriented 
assessment tool; however, these efforts failed for a plethora of reasons.  First, the 
tool HHS developed was too complex to use as a regulatory tool.141  Second, the 
cost estimates of implementing the regulations were estimated from $135 million 
to $435 million annually,142 which would have bankrupt the entire nursing home 
industry.  Third, the change in administration from President Carter to President 
Regan ushered in a change in perspective of nursing home quality issues in the 
White House and HHS.143
On July 14, 1980, HHS published new rules to shift the focus from 
facility-oriented reviews to concentrate on patient care.144  President Regan 
immediately rescinded these regulations, leaving the 1974 regulations in place.145
In 1981, HHS created the Task Force on Regulatory Reform to reevaluate the 
proposed rules.146  The Task Force recommended to retain most of the 1980 
regulations, but suggested the deletion of some sections and deference to state 
law.147  This report was used to craft new regulations, which received major 
protest from the public and members of Congress, so the Secretary decided to 
concentrate on changing the procedures for applying the standards rather than 
changing the 1974 survey and certification regulations.148  These new procedures 
included reducing the inspection requirements of facilities with good compliance 
136
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 148 & 245-246.
137 Id. at 148.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 245-246.
141 Id. at 246.
142 Id. at 247.
143 Id.  
144
 45 Fed. Reg. 47368-47385 (July 14, 1980).  
145
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 247.  
146 Id., See also Robert Pear, U.S. May Ease Regulation of Nursing Home 
Industry, N.Y. TIMES, SEPT. 7, 2001, at A1.
147
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 247-8.  
148 Id.
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records and replacing government certification with accreditation by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, the same body that 
accredits hospitals.149  In May of 1982, HHS announced the implementation of 
these proposed changes.150  Members of Congress and the public viewed these 
changes as a means to reduce federal oversight of the nursing home industry.151
Thus, Congress imposed a moratorium on the proposed changes and ordered the 
Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) of the National Academy of Sciences to study the 
quality of care provided in nursing homes and publish a Report [hereinafter IOM 
Report].152
To compile a study of quality of care in nursing homes, the IOM formed a 
Committee consisting of twenty members with knowledge and experience in the 
regulation of nursing homes.153  Data for the Report was collected from sundry 
places.  Public hearings were held in five different cities;154 reports from 1978 
HHS hearings and congressional hearings on nursing home quality were 
reviewed; surveys were mailed to every state licensure and certification director; 
and case studies were conducted in six states.155  The case studies were 
particularly important to the Report because Committee members conducted 
interviews of all interested parties, including nursing home administrators and 
federal and state regulators and conducted site visits of nursing homes.156  The 
Committee compiled its research and published its recommendations in March of 
1986 to change the regulation of nursing homes to ensure that residents were 
provided quality care.157
According to the IOM Report, most consumers, long-term care providers, 
and state regulators felt that nursing homes were safer in 1986 than prior to the 
1974 regulations, but there was room for improvement.158  Consequently, the 
IOM recommended forty-eight changes, “with regulatory criteria, with the 
process of inspecting and certifying nursing homes, with the enforcement process, 
with the ombudsman program, and with issues requiring further study.”159
Important recommended changes included eliminating the distinction between 
SNFs, ECFs, and ICFs, making quality of care and life conditions of participation 
149
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 248.
150 Id. at 1.
151 Id. at 248
152 Id.
153 Id. at v-vi.
154 Id. at vi-vii.  The hearings were held in Atlanta, Dallas, Los Angeles, 
Minneapolis, and Philadelphia.  Id. at vii.
155 Id. The Committee studied regulation of nursing homes in California, 
Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, and Texas.  Id.
156 Id. at vi.
157 Id. at 1.
158 Id. at 6. 
159 Id. at 25.
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for both the Medicare and Medicaid program, consolidating the Medicare and 
Medicaid survey and certification requirements, strengthening the federal 
oversight of survey operations, and implementing a set of intermediate sanctions 
to penalize nursing homes out of compliance with Medicare.160  The IOM Report 
served as the basis for statutory changes in the regulation of nursing homes.161  In 
addition to these recommendations, Congress used several federal court decisions 
concerning nursing homes to draft the Nursing Home Reform Act.162  The most 
influential case was, In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler163 in which the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit required HHS to change the Medicare and 
Medicaid regulations from a facility-oriented focus to a patient and outcome 
oriented approach.164
2. Judicial order for change. – Medicaid recipients residing in Colorado 
nursing homes brought a class action civil rights suit165 against the Secretary in 
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.166  The Medicaid 
recipients asserted that the Secretary violated their Constitutional right to receive 
quality medical and psychosocial care in nursing homes by failing to fulfill his 
160 Id. at 71-170.
161 See also IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & Environment with Select Committee 
on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care House Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 99th Congress 8 (2d Sess. 1986) (statement of Dr. Katz, Chair, the 
Committee on Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report).
162 H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 452 and 470 (1987).
163 In re Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 588 (1984).  In fact, this 
opinion was referred to in the IOM Report as support for their contention that Medicare 
regulations should be changed from facility-oriented to patient-oriented regulations.  
IOM Report, supra note 7, at 15.  
164 Id. at 74-77.
165
 The Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking remedies for 
alleged violations of their constitutional right to be provided quality care in nursing 
homes certified to participate in the Medicaid program.  See In re Estate of Smith v. 
O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. 289, 290 (1983).  The case was first filed on May 16, 1975, but 
did not go to trial until May 17, 1982.
166
 The defendants of the suit included the Secretary, all the nursing home owners 
and administrators of Medicaid certified nursing homes in Colorado, and the officers of 
the Colorado Department of Social Services and the Colorado Department of Health.  
O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 290 (1983).  The State officials were dropped from the suit in 
exchange for their stipulation that the State would file a complaint against the Secretary 
seeking a revision of the Medicaid nursing home enforcement system.  Id. at 290-291.  
Pursuant to the stipulation of dismissal the Colorado Attorney General filed a suit against 
the Secretary seeking declaratory and injunctive relief for the Secretary’s alleged failure 
to fulfill the mandate of the Social Security of 1935 by not effectively regulating 
Medicaid nursing homes. Id. at 291.
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statutory duty under Medicaid to regulate the actual care provided in nursing 
homes.167  The Secretary argued that HHS had fulfilled the requirements of 
Medicaid by publishing advisory enforcement standards governing state 
inspection of Medicaid certified nursing homes.168 Each side’s arguments 
centered on the duties of the Secretary under the Medicaid Act.
The Medicaid Act authorized the Secretary to fund state plans to provide 
“health care to needy persons through agreements with private and public persons 
and institutions capable of providing such services.”169  Under 42 U.S.C. § 
1396(a), the Secretary could only approve state plans, which included the 
condition that the plan must provide a description of the methods of inspection the 
state would use to certify that the nursing homes provided care of high quality.170
The Secretary had the authority to “look behind” the state’s determination of a 
nursing home’s compliance with the state Medicaid plan.171  Based on the “look 
behind” provision, if the Secretary found that the state plan was deficient and the 
state failed to show that it had implemented an effective inspection program, the 
Secretary had to reduce the percentage of federal funds given to the state’s 
Medicaid program.172
The Secretary argued that the agency fulfilled its duty by promulgating 
regulations and developing forms to be used by the States to certify the 
compliance of nursing homes.173  However, according to the plaintiffs, these 
forms were deficient because they were “facility-oriented” not “patient-oriented.”
174
  The forms only required states to review the physical appearance of the 
facility and theoretical capability of a nursing home to render quality care, instead 
of regulating the actual care provided to patients in nursing homes, which 
according to the Medicaid recipients violated the “look behind” provision.175
Agreeing with the Secretary, the court ruled that HHS had fulfilled the 
167
 Although the States administer the Medicaid program, the Plaintiffs argued 
that the Secretary had a duty to regulate Colorado’s Medicaid plan based on the powers 
Congress granted the Secretary under Medicaid. Id. at 295.
168 Id.
169 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308-9 (1980).  
170 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(22), 1396a(a)(28), 1395x(j) (2004).   
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(b) (2004).  This “look behind” provision was passed 
as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, the same bill that created alternative 
sanctions to termination of long-term care facilities. See Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 916, 94 
Stat. 2599 (1980).
172 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395b(g)(3) (2004).
173
 HHS provided the states with Form SSA-1569 to certify the compliance of 
nursing home’s with the Medicaid requirements.  See O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 295.  
174 Id.
175 Id.  In fact, out of the 541 questions contained in the form only 30 were 
related to patient care or required actual patient observation.  See Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 
588 (1984).
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requirements of the Medicaid Act by promulgating regulations and providing 
forms to the States, reasoning that the duty to ensure that the residents of nursing 
homes received quality care was up to the Colorado Department of Health 
through its licensure powers. 176
In 1984, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.177  Reversing the district court’s decision, the court 
ruled that the Secretary had violated the plaintiffs’ Constitutional rights by 
promulgating a “facility-oriented” rather than a “patient-oriented” enforcement 
system to regulate nursing home care.178  Because the purpose of the Medicaid 
Act was to provide high quality medical care to needy persons, the court reasoned 
that the use of the facility-oriented scheme, which failed to survey the quality of 
patient care violated the dictates of the Medicaid Act.179  The court reviewed the 
legislative history of the “look behind” provision and found that Congress passed 
the law “to assure that federal matching funds are being used to reimburse only 
those SNFs and ICFs that actually comply with Medicaid requirements.”180
Consequently, the court ruled that by granting the Secretary the “look 
behind” authority Congress mandated the Secretary to make an independent 
determination of whether a Medicaid certified nursing home actually meets the 
requirements of the state plan irrespective of the State’s findings when the 
Secretary had cause.181  According to Congress, cause included complaints made 
to the Secretary by the residents, advocates, or others about the quality of care or 
condition of the facility.182 Because the residents in this case had complained to 
the Secretary about the quality of care and the Secretary failed to use his authority 
under the “look behind” provision, the court remanded the case back to the district 
court and ordered the court to compel the Secretary to revise and implement new 
Medicaid regulations that focused on the quality of care furnished Medicaid 
recipients in nursing homes.183
176 O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 296.
177 Heckler, 747 F.2d 583 (1984).
178 Id. at 587.
179 Id. at 590.
180 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 57 (1980), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5570 
(1990).
181 Id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. 96-1479, at 140-41 (1980).
182
 H.R. CONF. REP. 96-1479, at 141 (1980).
183 Heckler, 747 F.2d at 591. On June 10, 1985, the United States District Court 
for the District of Colorado ordered the Secretary to promulgate new regulations 
consistent with the Court of Appeals mandate.  See HHS Plan of Compliance with Court 
Order in Smith v. Heckler, 1985 WL 56558 (D.Colo. 1985).  Nevertheless, the Secretary 
failed to meet all the objectives of the order and was ordered to revise its regulations and 
finally found in contempt of the order in 1987.  See In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 656 
F. Supp. 1093 (D. Colo. 1987).  See also In re Estate of Smith v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 
586 (D. Colo. 1987).  In 1988, the Secretary submitted the passage of the Nursing Home 
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This decision by the Court of Appeals, 184 not only affected Medicaid 
regulations, but it also influenced the regulation of Medicare certified nursing 
homes because the facility-oriented enforcement system HHS advised the States 
to use in regulating Medicaid certified facilities was the same system HHS used in 
regulating Medicare certified facilities.185  Thus, the decision also called into 
question the validity of the Medicare regulations.  This class action lawsuit, 
coupled with the findings of the IOM Report, were the catalyst for significant 
Congressional changes in the way that nursing homes were regulated under 
Medicare.186
3. The Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987. – The Nursing Home Reform 
Act, which changed the entire survey and certification process, was the 
culmination of class action suits, the IOM Report, and numerous hearings held by 
Congress.  On March 21, 1986, Representative Claude Pepper offered the Nursing 
Home Resident Protection Act of 1986 to implement and expand the IOM’s 
recommendation.187  The Act included seven sections and proposed penalizing the 
nursing home as well as the states for noncompliance with the Medicare and 
Medicaid Acts.  In fact, Section II made nursing home owners and operators 
criminally liable for “harm to residents of their facilities caused by facility 
negligence or other wrongdoing” and created a private right of action to allow 
residents and advocates to sue nursing homes under Medicare and Medicaid for 
noncompliance with the federal standards.188  Additionally, Section V provided 
the federal government with the power to penalize states that did not “carry out 
enforcement actions against noncompliant nursing homes” by withholding 
funding for survey and certification.189  These suggestions were not enacted.190
Reform Act as means of compliance, but the court ruled that, “the passage of the OBRA 
[of 1987] in no way modifies or preempts the tenth Circuit’s decision.” Smith v. Bowen, 
1988 WL 235574 (D. Colo. 1988). In June, the Secretary finally enacted regulations in 
compliance with the court’s order, amending both the Medicaid and Medicare 
regulations. See 53 Fed. Reg. 22850-01 (June 17, 1988).
184 See O’Halloran, 557 F. Supp. at 290, rev’d sub. nom., Heckler, 747 F.2d 583.  
185 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(j)(15) (2004).
186
 See Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73, 
87 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  See also IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & Environment with Select 
Committee on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care House Comm. on 
Energy & Commerce, 99th Congress 8 (2d Sess. 1986) (statement of Dr. Katz, Chair, the 
Committee on Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report).





Four days later, the House of Representative’s Committee on Energy & 
Commerce held a hearing concerning the IOM Report and examined the quality 
of health care provided in nursing homes.191  The hearing centered on the 
testimony of Dr. Katz, the Chair of the Committee on Nursing Home Regulation 
that authored the IOM Report, who reiterated the recommendations of the 
Report.192  Several more hearings were held by the Senate Special Committee on 
Aging193 and the Committee on Energy and Commerce regarding nursing home 
reform.194  On October 15, 1986, Representatives Pete Stark and Henry Waxman 
introduced the Medicare Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care Amendments of 
1986 (H.R. 5712), a companion to the Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home Quality 
Care Amendments of 1986 (H.R. 5450),195 to improve the nursing home 
regulatory system.196  The bill was based on the IOM’s Report but was not 
enacted due to Congress’ early adjournment.197
On June 24, 1987, Representatives Pete Stark and several other 
Representatives introduced the Medicare Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care 
Amendments of 1987, a companion to the Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home 
Quality Care Amendments of 1987 (H.R. 2270), which included significant 
revisions from the bills offered in 1986 including a twenty-four hour registered 
nursing staff requirement for all nursing homes.198  These bills were initially 
disregarded because many Congressmen were worried that it would “have made it 
impossible for small, rural ICFs to stay open because it offered no flexibility in 
190 Id.  Some of the proposed changes did make it into the Nursing Home Reform 
Act of 1987 such as making compliance with resident’s rights to autonomy and respect a 
condition of participation.  Id.
191
 IOM Report on Nursing Home Regulation, supra note 121 at 8; also IOM 
Report, supra note 7, at 2.
192 See also IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigation, Subcomm. on Health & Environment with Select Committee 
on Aging, Subcomm. on Health And Long Term Care House Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 99th Congress 8 (1986) (statement of Dr. Katz, Chair, the Committee on 
Nursing Home Regulation that authored the IOM Report).
193
 A.D. Joseph Emerzian and Timothy Stampp, Nursing Home Reform: Its 
Legislative History and Economic Impact Upon Nursing Homes, BENEFITS Q. 19, 24-24 
(1993), citing Nursing Home Care: The Unfinished Agenda Before Special Committee on 
Aging, 99th Congress (2d Sess. 1986).
194
 132 CONG. REC. E3627-02 (1986).
195
 132 CONG. REC. E2998-02 (1986).  The bill was similar to the final Nursing 
Home Reform Act of 1987 in some ways.  It included all of the same sections as the 
Nursing Home Reform Act of 1987, except the annual report section and the detailed 
chart with effective dates.  
196
 132 CONG. REC. E3627-02 (1986).
197
 133 CONG. REC. S8050-03 (1987).  
198
 133 CONG. REC. E2598-01 (1987).
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meeting the increased staffing requirements.”199 On April 29, 1987, Senator 
George Mitchell and several other Senators introduced the Medicare and 
Medicaid Skilled Nursing Home Quality Care Amendments of 1986 (S. 1106).200
This bill along with the H.R. 2270 became the Nursing Home Reform Act of 
1987.  The Senate bill noted the improvements in nursing home quality care since 
1967, but noted that residents still received ‘shockingly deficient-care’ in 
substandard quality nursing homes.201  The Senate bill also included a grant 
program for innovative practices in nursing homes that provide a maximum 
$25,000 grant to nursing homes that enhanced quality of care for residents.202
The final Nursing Home Reform Act203 was a compromise of both the Senate and 
House of Representatives bills and did not include the grant provision. 204
The Nursing Home Reform Act included seven specific sections 
regulating the care of Medicare and Medicaid certified nursing homes: 
requirements for nursing facilities use of resident assessments, survey and 
certification process, enforcement process, personal needs allowance, effective 
dates, and annual repot.205  The most relevant changes were included in the survey 
and certification and enforcement sections.  The survey and certification section 
created a system by which nursing homes would be inspected annually and the 
enforcement section directed HHS to impose remedies such as denial of payment 
for new admissions, civil money penalties, and temporary management.206  The 
enforcement section also required HHS and the states to impose harsher remedies 
for repeated noncompliance.207  In addition, to these changes the Nursing Home 
Reform Act included a time table that mandated that HHS and the States make 
certain changes by specific dates.208  Subsequently, HHS published a final rule 
without comments on November 10, 1994 effective July 10, 1995.209  Even 
though it took eight years before these regulations became effective, they still 
govern the survey and certification process today.
199
 133 CONG. REC. H29905-03 (1987).
200




 Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 1107 (1987).
204 See generally, David Bohm, Striving for Quality Health in America’s Nursing 
Homes: Tracing the History of Nursing Homes and Noting the Effect of Recent Federal 
Government Initiatives to Ensure Quality Care in the Nursing Home Setting, 4 DEPAUL J. 
HEALTH CARE L. 317 (2001).  
205
 H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987).
206 Id. at 465-77.
207 Id. at 474.
208 Id. at 497-99.
209 See 59 Fed. Reg. 56116 (Nov. 10, 1994); 60 Fed. Reg. 50441 (Sept. 29, 1995).  
There have been no drastic changes in the regulations governing the hearing process 
since these amendments.  
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Under the current survey and certification system, once a nursing home is 
certified to participate in Medicare, the home is visited every nine to fifteen 
months,210 a standard survey, by a State health agency survey team211 comprised 
of nurses, nutritionists, social workers, and physical therapists to certify continued 
compliance with the Medicare regulations.212  If the survey team finds the nursing 
home out of compliance with the Medicare regulations it cites the facility for a 
deficiency213 and assigns a scope and severity level to the deficiency based on the 
egregiousness of the offense.  The scope is the number of residents affected and 
the severity level refers to the seriousness of the harm. 214  The scope and severity 













210 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.3(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(3) (2004).
211 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.308(a) (2004).
212
 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(2).  The majority of nursing homes are also certified to 
participate in the Medicaid program.  See 42 C.F.R. § 488.300 (2004).  Thus, the survey 
team usually cites the nursing home for both Medicare and Medicaid violations.  That is 
where the similarity ends.  Unlike the Medicare hearing process, States usually provide 
nursing homes with an opportunity to refute survey findings during an informal hearing 
process.  42 C.F.R. § 488.331(a)(1) (2004).  In addition, the State affords the nursing 
home the opportunity to challenge all noncompliance findings in a full evidentiary 
hearing.  42 C.F.R. § 431.153(i) (2004).
213
 There are a total of 190 possible deficiencies divided into seventeen different 
categories, for which HHS can cite a nursing home.  See The Office of the Inspector 
General, Nursing Home Deficiency Trends and Survey and Certification Process 
Consistency 1, OEI-02-01-00600, March 2004. Most deficiencies are categorized into 
three main areas: quality of care (42 C.F.R. § 483.25); quality of life (42 C.F.R. § 
483.15); and resident behavior and facility practice (42 C.F.R. § 483.13).  
214
 42 C.F.R. § 488.404(b) (2004).  The scope of the deficiency means whether 
the deficiency was isolated, constituted a pattern of behavior, or was widespread.  See 42 
C.F.R. § 488.404(b)(2) (2004).  The severity is whether a facility’s deficiencies caused: 
no actual harm with a potential for minimal harm; no actual harm with a potential for 
more than minimal harm, but not immediate jeopardy; actual harm that is not immediate 
jeopardy; or immediate jeopardy to a resident’s health or safety. See 42 C.F.R. § 
488.404(b)(1) (2004).  
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No actual harm 





All of the alleged deficiencies are then recorded with the corresponding letter to 
denote scope and severity level on a Statement of Deficiencies and sent to HHS 
for approval.215  Once HHS approves the findings of noncompliance, it posts its 
findings on its website and notifies the nursing home ombudsman, the physicians 
and skilled nursing facility administration licensing board, and the State Medicaid 
fraud and abuse control units.216  Upon approval from HHS, the State agency 
sends a copy of the Statement of Deficiencies to the offending nursing home 
along with a letter noting all the remedies imposed.217  Remedies that may be 
imposed includes directed plan of correction, state monitoring, directed in-service 
training, denial of payment for new admissions, denial of payment for all 
Medicare patients, a civil money penalty from $50 -$10,000, and temporary 
management.218  HHS also sends the nursing home a letter confirming the 
imposition of a remedy and the duration of each imposed remedy.219   If the 
nursing home decides to appeal the alleged noncompliance findings it bears the 
burden of proof and must file a hearing request within sixty days from the date of 
both the state’s and HHS’ letter.220  The hearing request is sent to HHS’ judicial 
board then assigned to a specific ALJ.  
215
 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.330(d), 488.402(f)(1) (2004).  The Statement of Deficiencies 
(“SOD”) details the nursing home’s violations of the Medicare regulations and factual 
incidents to support these allegations.  Id.  The SOD is issued prior to a nursing home 
requesting a hearing.  42 C.F.R. § 488.18(b)(1) (2004).
216
 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5).  The information remains posted until the next 
annual survey is conducted.  
217 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.18(b)(1) (2004),488.402(f)(2) (2004).
218 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.404 (2004).  A nursing home is out of compliance with 
the Medicare regulations, if the deficiency creates more than a potential for causing 
minimal harm.  42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (2004).  Remedies are only imposed if a nursing 
home is not in substantial compliance with the Medicare regulations.  42 C.F.R. § 
488.400 (2004).  
219
 42 C.F.R. § 488.402 (2004).
220
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5(k), 498.40(c)(1) (2004).  Usually to preserve its hearing 
rights, nursing homes must file an appeal to each letter it receives that discusses the 
imposition of remedies even if the information is duplicated.  See Concourse Rehab. & 
Nursing v. Thompson, 2004 WL 434434 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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The hearing process varies based on which of the eight ALJs is presiding 
over the case;221 hearings can last from one to five days and include only cross-
examination testimony.222  Once the ALJ issues a ruling, the nursing home has 
sixty days to appeal the decision to the DAB.223  After receiving a ruling from the 
DAB, the nursing home may appeal the case to federal district court.  This whole 
hearing process usually takes a number of years to reach the federal level.224  The 
current hearing system is a drastic change from the structure of initial nursing 
home hearings that only allowed informal hearings for the imposition of remedies 
other than termination.225
B. Expanding the Structure of Nursing Home Hearings
The structure of nursing homes hearings has always been connected to the 
severity of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance.  Prior to 1980, termination 
was the only federal sanction that HHS could impose on nursing homes out of 
compliance with the Medicare regulations.226  HHS, however, did grant the 
facility a full evidentiary hearing either before termination or within 120 days 
after the termination became effective.227  In 1980, with the passage of the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (“OBRA of 1980”), Congress created a new 
intermediate sanction, denial of payments for new Medicare admissions, and 
granted the Secretary of HHS the authority to impose this remedy for nursing 
home deficiencies that did not cause immediate jeopardy228 to patients.229
221
 There are eight HHS ALJs to cover all of the nursing homes cases nationwide.  
The Chief ALJ is Silva and he serves with the following ALJs in order of seniority: ALJ 
Kessel, Hughes, Anglada, Montano, Smith, Sickendick, and Blair.
222
 Pre-hearing orders of individual ALJs (on file with the author).
223
 42 C.F.R. § 498.80 (2004).
224 See Lutheran Home – Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 
1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 
1767 (2001).
225 See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7194 (codified as 42 C.F.R. § 442.118 (1986))
226 See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7191 (Feb. 21, 1985).
227 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7191.  From 1980 to 1984, there were 967 voluntary 
nursing home cancellations of participation in Medicare and only 159 terminations from 
the Medicare program.  IOM Report, supra note 7, at 156. HHS used termination of a 
facility from Medicare as the last resort.  HHS provided nursing homes with several 
opportunities to become complaint through follow-up visits.  Id. at 148.  Even once s 
facility was de-certified from the program, HHS would allow the facility to re-enter the 
Medicare program, if the facility provided “reasonable assurance” that the deficiencies 
that caused termination would not be repeated. STEVENS, supra note 123 at 149, citing 
HHS, Survey and Certification National Review, Unpublished Briefing Materials, Health 
Standards and Quality Bureau, Health Care Financing Administration (1984).
228
 Immediate Jeopardy is defined as “a situation in which the provider’s 
noncompliance with one or more requirements of participation has caused, or is likely to 
cause, serious injury, harm, impairment, or death to a resident.” See 42 C.F.R. § 489.3 
30
Under this provision, a facility found out of compliance with the Medicare 
regulations was first given the opportunity to develop and implement a plan of 
correction for its deficiencies.230  If the facility was unable to fulfill the 
requirements set forth in the plan of correction, the Secretary then had the right to 
impose the sanction of denial of payments for new admissions.231  Congress 
created this new process and sanction because it would “serve to protect 
beneficiaries both by giving the skilled nursing facility an incentive to correct 
deficiencies in a timely manner and by forestalling the need for traumatic 
transfers of large numbers of patients during the time needed improvements are 
being made in the facility.”232  Nevertheless, Congress cautioned the Secretary not 
to use the sanction to allow facilities who placed their patients in immediate 
jeopardy to stay in the Medicare program.233 Congress also created an informal 
hearing process for nursing facilities to challenge the imposition of the 
intermediate sanction, denial of payments for new admissions.234
Although Congress granted the Secretary the power to impose the new 
sanction in 1980, HHS did not issue proposed rules to implement this authority 
until 1985. 235  As directed by Congress, HHS proposed the new sanction and a 
new corresponding hearing process.  Before the imposition of this intermediate 
sanction, the nursing home would be granted a hearing236 in front of a hearing 
officer.237  This hearing allowed a nursing home the opportunity to present 
(2004).  The States now have the authority to impose this remedy for Medicare 
violations.  See 42 CFR § 488.408 (2004).
229 See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (“OBRA of 1980”), Pub. L. No. 96-
499, §916, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).  
230




 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 57.  Congress recognized that states already had a 




 In creating this new hearing process, Congress clearly stated that the process 
would not preclude nursing homes from seeking judicial review for factual disputes 
concerning noncompliance.  Id.
235
 The final rule was designated as 42 C.F.R. § 442.118 (1986).  The delay 
between the passage of the OBRA of 1980 and the promulgation of regulations was due 
to the change in administration and its focus on privatizing nursing home regulation.  
236
 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7192 (Feb. 21, 1985).  In the legislative history, Congress 
made a point to note that it was not altering access or the process of the full evidentiary 
hearing for termination.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-1479, 141 (1980), reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5903, 5932.
237 See 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7193 (Feb. 21, 1985); 51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24487 
(July 3, 1986).  
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evidence in person or in writing that proved it was in substantial compliance.238
HHS would then issue a written ruling to the facility.239  Even though, HHS 
granted nursing homes these hearing rights to appeal the intermediate sanction, it 
specifically limited the hearing to “something less than a full evidentiary 
hearing.”240  In the background discussion of the proposed rule, HHS specifically 
stated, “we believe that since the imposition of a denial of payments as compared 
with terminations is a lesser and temporary sanction, a hearing less than a full 
evidentiary hearing would satisfy all due process requirements.”241  Therefore, 
according to HHS, the hearing nursing homes received for the imposition of this 
intermediate sanction would only be an “informal” one.242  Nursing homes were 
only granted a full evidentiary hearing when HHS threatened termination from the 
Medicare Program.243  This dichotomy between a formal and informal hearing 
continued until 1987, with the passage of the Nursing Home Reform Act.244
In the Nursing Home Reform Act, Congress changed the severity of the 
sanctions as well as the structure of the hearing process.  These changes were 
based on the recommendations made in the IOM Report.245  According to the 
IOM Report, more nursing homes would comply if the sanction was imposed 
prior to a hearing.246  Moreover, to prevent frivolous appeals, the IOM Committee 
suggested that facilities not be given a stay from termination during the appeals 
process and that deficiency findings be solely based on the events that occurred 
during the survey and not the condition of the facility at the time of the hearing.247
238 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194; 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487.
239 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194; 51 Fed. Reg. at 24491.
240
 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194.  See 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487.
241 See 50 Fed. Reg. at 7194.
242 Id.; see also 51 Fed. Reg. at 24487.  HHS failed to provide a definition of a 
full evidentiary hearing versus an informal hearing in the Federal Register, so the 
definition for the Administrative Procedure Act controls.  See Administrative Procedure 
Act of 1946 (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).  According to the APA, a formal hearing is 
defined as, “every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record 
after opportunity of an agency hearing ...” Id.
243
 50 Fed. Reg. 7191, 7194 (Feb. 21, 1985).  Congress purposely did not alter 
nursing homes access to a full evidentiary hearing to challenge termination from 
Medicare.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-1479, 141 (1980).
244
 Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 1107 (1987).
245
 During the hearings, Dr. Katz, the Chair of the Committee on Nursing Home 
Regulation that authored the IOM Report, recommended that the appeal process for 
alleged violations of the Medicare regulations be made “less attractive” for “really bad 
facilities.”  See IOM Study on Nursing Home Regulation; supra note 128 at 9 &12.  This 
practice was implemented in the regulations, but was applied to all nursing homes 
appealing alleged violations of the Medicare Act.  
246
 IOM Report, supra note 7, at 159.
247 Id.
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In response to these recommendations, in the Nursing Home Reform Act 
of 1987 Congress added several more sanctions, now entitled “remedies,” to the 
Medicare Program.248  Congress also mandated that HHS take into account repeat 
deficiencies when imposing these remedies and made it harder for a facility that 
has been terminated from Medicare program to re-enter the program.249
Additionally, Congress combined the formal hearing for termination and the 
informal hearing for other sanctions into a single hearing process.250  This process 
was implemented in 1995, when HHS promulgated the hearing process 
regulations.  The relevant regulations are 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60,251 498.62,252 and 
498.66.253  Under these new regulations nursing homes are granted the right to 
present evidence in front of an ALJ,254 unlike the original informal hearing 
process where nursing homes would present evidence to a hearing officer.255  The 
new regulations also gave nursing homes the right to examine their own 
witnesses256 and bring any participant to the hearing not limited to their 
representatives and technical advisors.257  Even though, nursing homes were 
granted a full evidentiary hearing, it was limited to cases in which HHS had 
imposed remedies.258  Without the imposition of remedies the nursing home was 
not granted any right to a hearing, but the findings remained on HHS’ website and 
were used for the imposition of future remedies.  Hence, nursing homes file a suit 
federal court to challenge the lack of procedural Due Process protections afforded 
them in Medicare compliance hearings. 259
248 H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987) (codified as 60 Fed. Reg. 50118 
(Sept. 28, 1995)).
249
 Nursing Home Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 100-203, §§ 4201-4218, 105 Stat. 
1107 (1987).  These sections were based on the recommendations made in the IOM 
Report.  IOM Report, supra note 7, at 155-156.
250 H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 (2d Sess. 1987) (codified as 52 Fed. Reg. 22444, 
22447-22448 (June 12, 1987)).
251
 This regulation defines the conduct of nursing home hearings, which is left to 
the discretion of the ALJ within certain limits.  See 42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2004).  One 
particular limit is how witnesses are treated.  See 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
252
 This regulation states that, “the representative of each party is permitted to 
examine his or her own witnesses subject to interrogation by the representative of the 
other party.”  42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
253
 This rule governs nursing homes’ right to waive their right to appear and 
present evidence at an in-person hearing. 42 C.F.R. § 498.66 (2004).
254
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.45, 498.60 (2004).
255
 51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24491 (July 3, 1986).
256
 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
257
 42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2004).
258
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.3(b)(13), 488.406 (2004).
259
 HHS has continued to issue nursing home regulations to strengthen 
enforcement.  See HHS Fact Sheet, Assuring quality care for nursing home residents, 
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=384 (last visited 
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IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NURSING HOME PROCEEDINGS
The failure of HHS to actually grant nursing homes the broad procedural 
Due Process rights granted in the Nursing Home Reform Act and codified in the 
Medicare regulations, the right to a full evidentiary hearing for any findings of 
noncompliance, was the basis of the case entitled Shalala v. Illinois Council on 
Long Term Care, Inc.260 As a result of nursing homes’ dissatisfaction with the 
new Medicare regulations, the Illinois Council on Long Term Care, Inc., on 
behalf of its members, sued HHS Secretary Donna Shalala in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for the violation of their 
Constitutional right to Due Process.261  The case ultimately reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which deferred to the Secretary’s interpretations.  
A. The District Court case
Prior to the implementation of the Nursing Home Reform Act regulations, 
only six percent of nursing homes in Illinois were found noncompliant,262 while in 
1995 when the regulations took effect, seventy percent of nursing homes in 
Illinois were found out of compliance with the regulations.263  The Illinois 
Council for Long Term Care (“Council”) filed a complaint seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief from the Secretary’s and the Illinois Department of Public 
Health’s use of the Medicare regulations proscribed by Congress in the Nursing 
Home Reform Act, claiming that the drastic change in noncompliance rates was 
due to unconstitutionally vague standards.  Moreover, the Council submitted that 
the appeals process to challenge noncompliance findings was meaningless and 
thus violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  
Instead of addressing these issues, HHS collaterally attacked the Council’s 
claims by arguing that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§1331264 and 1346265 to hear the case because the case arose under the 
Mar. 15, 2004).  As a result, a nursing home with one deficiency where the resident 
suffered actual harm was traditionally assessed a civil money penalty of $100 per day.  
Id.  Now, however, the same facility is being fined upwards of $300 per day.  Id.
260 See Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1 (2000).
261 Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347 (N.D.Ill. 1997).
262 Id. at *1.
263 Id.
264
 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising 
under the Constitution, Laws, or treaties of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. §1331 (2004).
265
 “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction concurrent, with the 
Federal Court of Claims of any civil claim against the United States for the recovery of 
any internal-revenue tax or any other civil action or claim against the United States, not 
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of 
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Medicare Act.266  Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 405(h), federal courts are barred 
from reviewing any Social Security action under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1346 
before HHS has issued a final ruling.  Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) limits 
federal review to final decisions issued by the Secretary.  This review is further 
limited by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), which prohibits federal review of claims based on 
federal question jurisdiction unless the statute authorizes review and the Secretary 
issues a final decision.  This bar to federal review before a final decision from the 
Secretary was incorporated into the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. §§1320a-7a(c)(2) 
and (j)(1).267
The requirements in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) & (h) allowed the Secretary to 
channel all nursing home claims through the agency in a special review process.  
Because the Council bypassed this process in filing this case, HHS asserted the 
district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.  Based on this bar, HHS 
requested that the court dismiss the case because the Council never presented the 
case to HHS and failed to receive a final agency ruling before presenting the issue 
to federal court.268  In response to HHS’ arguments, the Council contended that 
the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction because: the claims did not 
arise under the Medicare Act; HHS had no authority to decide Constitutional or 
statutory challenges; there was no other avenue for judicial review of Due Process 
claims and thus under Bowen immediate federal review was appropriate; and 
some claims arose under the Medicaid Act, which did not include a subject matter 
jurisdiction bar.269
First, the court found that the Council’s complaints did arise under the 
Medicare Act because the complaints addressed the failure of HHS to comply 
with the Medicare Act, required the analysis of provisions of the Medicare Act, 
and the resolution of the case would directly impact the “applicability and 
enforceability of the Medicare Act.”270  Second, although only the federal courts 
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied 
contract with the United States.”  28 U.S.C. §§1346 (2004).
266 Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347, at *2.
267
 Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(c)(2), nursing homes are granted a right to a 
hearing.  These hearing rights are limited by 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(j)(1), which makes 42 
U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) applicable to nursing home hearings.  The Court discussed 42 
U.S.C. § 1395cc(h)(1) (2004) as the section that provided hearing rights to nursing homes 
to challenge noncompliance findings; however, this section only applies to those 
challenging the Secretary’s determinations that are not providers of services under the 
Medicare Act.  The section that nursing homes provides nursing homes with hearing 
rights is 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2) (2004), which is used throughout the paper instead of 
§ 1395cc(h)(1).




have the authority to decide consitutional or statutory challenges271 and the 
Medicare regulations specifically state that the Secretary will not hear appeals 
challenging the method of the survey or the choice of remedies,272 the court ruled 
that 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) requried these challenges to first be presented to 
HHS for resolution.  Presuming that the central reason for the Council’s case was 
the attainment of benefits, the court reasoned that the federal review bar would 
allow the “Secretary an opportunity prior to Constitutional litigation to determine 
whether plaintiff’s claims are either invalid or resolvable under some other 
provision of the Medicare Act.”273
Third, the the court held that the exception for immediate federal review 
created by the Supreme Court in Bowen no longer applied to Medicare cases.274
In Bowen, the Supreme Court ruled that physician challenges concerning the 
receipt of benefits under Medicare Part B could be heard in federal court prior to 
presentment of the issue to HHS because there was no other avenue for review in 
HHS.275  Given that Congress revised the Medicare Act to grant hearing rights to 
all providers under the Medicare Act after the Bowen case, the court ruled that the 
Bowen exceptio was void and the Council had to present the case first to HHS.276
Finally, the court determined that any resolution of the Council’s Medicaid issues 
would effect Medicare, allowing the nursing home to get their Medicare claims in 
through the back door.277
Summarily rejecting all of the Council’s contentions, the district court 
dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Council appealed 
the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit, which 
reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case to the district court 
for further review.  
B. Upon Appeal to the Seventh Circuit 
In its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Council reasserted its claims that 
the regulations violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because 
the regulations were too vague and failed to provide any opportunity to be heard 
271 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803); U.S. v. Nourse, 34 U.S. 8, 28-29 
(1835).
272
 42 C.F.R. § 488.408 (2004).
273 Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347, *2.  This bar is understandable when a nursing 
home is challenging the Medicare regulations, which the Secretary has the authority to 
change.  However, when the channeling provision limits the federal review of 
Constitutional challenges to the Medicare Act, the Secretary’s review of the issue is 
meaningless because the Secretary has no authority to issue a ruling or even make 
changes to the Medicare Act.  
274 Id. at *3.
275 Bowen, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
276 Ill. Council, 1997 WL 158347, *3 (N.D.Ill. 1997).  
277 Id. at *4.
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before penalties were imposed.278  Additionally, the Council argued that the State 
Operations Manual used by state surveyors had not undergone the notice and 
comment period required by the APA and thus could not be used by HHS to 
regulate nursing homes.279  The Secretary again asserted that the Medicare claims 
were not reviewable based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h).280 HHS also asserted 
that the Medicaid claims were not ripe.281  To resolve the issue, the court 
reviewed three prominent Supreme Court cases: Salfi,282 Ringer,283 and Bowen.284
According to the Seventh Circuit, even though the Council’s challenges 
were based on the Constitution and the APA, the Supreme Court said in Salfi and 
Ringer that any claims for payments arise under the Medicare Act and claims 
arising under Medicare regardless of the legal theory must be channeled through 
the administrative process.285  But in Bowen, the Supreme Court held that as 
applied to Medicare, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) addressed “only amount determinations, 
that is calculations of reimbursement by the fiscal intermediary that implement 
the Medicare program and that matters which Congress did not delegate to private 
carriers, such as challenges to the validity of the Secretary’s instructions and 
regulations are cognizable in course of law.”286  The Seventh Circuit followed the 
Bowen decision, which presented an exception to the subject matter jurisdiction 
bar of federal review for cases that would not otherwise have any meaningful 
review.287  The Secretary restated its arguments from the district court, that the 
Bowen exception to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) only applied to claims that would 
never reach federal courts, but because Congress amended the Medicare Act this 
exception was void.288  According the Seventh Circuit, Bowen did not create an 
exception as the Secretary asserted and the district court accepted.289  Rather, 
Bowen said that the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) only applied 
to “amount determinations.”290
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court’s 
precedent did not support the Secretary’s arguments.291  In an immigration case 
278 Ill. Council, 143 F.3d 1072 (1998).




282 Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
283 Ringer, 466 U.S. 602 (1984).
284 Bowen, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
285 Ill. Council, 1143 F.3d 1072, 1074-1075 (1998).
286 Id. at 1075.  
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1075-1076.
290 Bowen, 476 U.S. at 678-81.
291 Ill. Council, 143 F.3d at 1075.
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decided in 1991, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule created in Bowen that 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) did not require Medicare regulatory challenges to be channeled 
through the agency if the challenge was separate from reimbursement requests.292
The Seventh Circuit had also ruled several times since Bowen that there was a 
difference between pre-enforcement challenges to Medicare regulations that are 
allowed and requests for payments that are barred until a final decision by the 
Secretary.293  For the aforementioned reasons, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further 
review, ruling that the exhaustion requirement of 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) & (h) did 
not prohibit the Council from bringing their Constitutional challenges.294
C. The Final Answer: the Supreme Court 
HHS appealed the Seventh Circuits ruling to the Supreme Court, 
reiterating its contention that federal courts did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the case and thus the case should have been dismissed.295  The 
Council argued that: (1) certain terms in the Medicare regulations such as 
“substantial compliance” were unconstitutionally vague; (2) the regulations and 
the State Operations Manual would allow inconsistent survey results in violation 
of 42 U.S.C. §1395i-3(g)(2)(D) and exceeded the mandate of the Medicare Act; 
(3) the regulations created administrative procedures inconsistent with the Due 
Process Clause; and (4) the State Operations Manual and other publications used 
by surveyors in citing nursing homes for deficiencies was not promulgated in 
accordance with the rulemaking requirements mandated by the APA.296 Before 
resolving the Council’s substantive claims, the Court first had to determine 
whether it had subject matter jurisdiction by discussing its precedent. 
In Salfi, the Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) created a nonwaivable
and nonexcusable requirement that an individual present a claim to the Secretary 
before seeking federal review when the claim arose under the Social Security 
292 McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 497 (1991).
293 See Martin v. Shalala, 63 F.3d 497 503-505 (7th Cir. 1995); Bodimetric 
Health Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 903 F.2d 480, 483-87 (7th Cir. 1990).
294 Ill. Council, 143 F.3d at 1078.
295
 Several other cases had been brought challenging the Constitutionality of the 
Medicare regulations, but many have been dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  See Mich. Ass’n. of Homes and Servs. for Aging, 127 F.3d 496, 500-01 (6th 
Cir. 1997); Am. Acad. of Dermatology v. HHS, 118 F.3d 1495, 1499-1501 (11th Cir. 
1997); St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 805, 812-13 (3rd Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
514 U.S. 1016 (1995); Farkas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 24 F.3d 853, 855-860 (6th 
Cir. 1994); Abbey v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37, 41-44 (2nd Cir 1992); Nat’l Kidney Patients 
Ass’n. v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1130-1134 (D.C. Cir. cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1049 
(1993).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the Circuits 
regarding its ruling in Bowen and whether it created an exception to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 
& (h). Therefore, the Court did not discuss the Council’s Medicaid claims.
296 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 7 (2000).
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Act.297  A claim arose under the Social Security Act when the Act provided “both 
the standing and the substantive basis for the presentation of th[e] Constitutional 
contentions.”298  Because the class members included requests for the payment of 
Social Security benefits, making it clear that the claims arose under the Social 
Security Act, the Court dismissed the claims of all the members.299  The Court in 
Ill. Council noted that the Council’s arguments did not contain any claim for 
benefits like the parties in Salfi but was still barred by the channeling provision by 
the Court’s decision in Ringer.  The Court in Ringer ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) 
prevented federal review of a challenge to the Secretary’s issuance of an 
administrative ruling denying reimbursement for a particular medical procedure 
where “both the standing and substantive basis for the presentation” of a claim is 
the Medicare Act.300
Based on these cases, the Court in Ill. Council reasoned that 42 U.S.C. § 
405(h) was a channeling provision that required all cases to be presented to the 
agency.301  Furthermore, the Court ruled that the requirement was more than an 
exhaustion requirement, which provides for exceptions to presentment, but an 
absolute requirement.302  Even though the Court noted that this ruling might cause 
some hardship, the complexities of Medicare and the need for the Secretary to 
have an opportunity to “apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes 
without possibly premature interference by different individual courts applying 
ripeness and exhaustion exceptions on a case by case basis” justified this 
channeling procedure.303  Additionally, the Court found no reason to distinguish 
between how 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) was applied to amount determinations versus 
Constitutional challenges.304  The Council submitted that the Court’s decisions in 
McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,305 Eldridge,306 and Bowen307 provided 
exceptions to this absolute channeling rule.
297 Id. at 15. 
298 Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 760-761 (1975).
299 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at  11.  The Court in Ill. Council incorrectly states that 
the claims of all the class members in Salfi were dismissed.  See Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 797 
(1975).
300 Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 615 (1984) quoting Salfi, 422 U.S. at 760-761.  This 
rule applies to both present and future claims for benefits. Ringer, 466 U.S. at 621-622.
301 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 12. 
302 Id. at 13.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 14.
305 McNary, 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (The Court held that individuals challenging the 
Immigration and Naturalization Services administration of the Special Agricultural 
Workers provisions of the Immigration Reform Control Act to determine the adjustment 
status of immigrants could be reviewed in federal court based on federal question 
jurisdiction to evaluate issues concerning the Due Process Clause, even though the statute 
barred federal question jurisdiction.).
306 Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 
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In response to the Council’s arguments the Court ruled that the decision in 
McNary involved different language and a different statute, which precluded any 
review of claims even after a final decision from the agency.308  Thus, according 
to the Court, if McNary had come under the Medicare Act then it would have 
been barred from federal review.309  The Court in Ill. Council ruled that in 
Eldridge, the claimant seeking Social Security disability benefits had presented 
the case first to the agency as required by 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) unlike the 
Council.310  Even though, Eldridge had not completed the process and received a 
final ruling, presentment was enough because his Constitutional claims were 
collateral to his claims for benefits according to the Court in Ill. Council.311
Hence, the decision in Eldridge did not assist the Council because the failed to 
present their case to HHS.312
The Court in Ill. Council also ruled that the exception to 42 U.S.C. § 
405(h) announced in Bowen, only applied in instances when the provision would 
foreclose any review because a serious Constitutional issue would be raised if 42 
U.S.C. § 405(h) was constructed to deny, rather than delay judicial review of 
Constitutional claims.313  Moreover, the Court rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision that Bowen created a new rule that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) only applied to 
amount determinations because it would overrule Salfi and Ringer.  The Court 
opined that in Bowen if it had planned to overrule these cases then it would have 
said so in its opinion. 314  The difference between Salfi/Ringer and Bowen is the 
difference between postponement of review (Salfi and Ringer) and total 
preclusion (Bowen).315 Consequently, the Court reviewed the Council’s claims to 
ascertain whether the regulations would prevent any judicial review, and thus 
whether the Bowen exception applied. 
The Council argued that HHS’ application of its channeling provision to 
the portion of the Medicare statute and regulations governing nursing home 
hearings amounted to the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial 
review.”316 According to the Council, nursing homes were granted access to the 
special review process only when termination was imposed, not when the 
Secretary imposed any other remedy.317  The Secretary asserted that any 
307 Bowen, 476 U.S. 667 (1986).
308 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 14 (2000).  
309 Id.
310 Id. at 15.
311 Id.
312 Id.
313 Id. at 17-18.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 19.
316 See Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 20 (2000), citing McNary, 498 U.S. 479, 497 
(1991).  
317 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 21 (2000).
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“dissatisfied” nursing home was entitled to have reviewed any determination that 
it failed to comply substantially with the statute, agreements, or regulations, 
regardless of the remedy imposed during the normal hearing process.318  The 
Court deferred to the Secretary’s interpretation because it was reasonable.319
The Council also argued that under 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12), unless a 
remedy was imposed no hearing was granted.  If no remedy was imposed, then a 
nursing home could fail to complete a plan of correction; however, the Secretary 
could then terminate the facility from Medicare participation.320  No facility 
would risk termination to bring a Constitutional challenge, so these regulations 
precluded federal review.  This is unconstitutional because the findings are used 
in later surveys as a means for harsh sanctions and are posted on the Internet.321
The Secretary summarily denied these practices and asserted that only minor 
penalties would be imposed for failing to submit a plan of correction.322  The 
Secretary also stated that HHS does not “cause providers to suffer more severe 
penalties in later enforcement actions based on findings that are unreviewable,” 
but conceded that the findings of noncompliance remain on the internet with a 
place for the nursing home to post a reply.323
Based on the Secretary’s representations of the HHS hearing process for 
nursing homes, the Court reasoned that its interpretation would not absolutely bar 
nursing homes from obtaining judicial review.324  Although the Court found that 
the language of the statute and 42 C.F.R. 498.3 was not free from ambiguity, 325
the Secretary’s interpretation that nursing homes were permitted to a hearing for 
findings of noncompliance and had access to a special review channel for these 
hearings was reasonable and legally permissible.326  The Court further reasoned 
that the:
procedural Medicare regulations327 limiting the extent to which the 
agency itself would provide the administrative review channel 
leading to judicial review ... does not amount to a denial of review 
so as to entitle challenger to avoid special review channel created 
under Medicare statutes, but, rather, the challenger remains free, 
318 Id.
319
 Id. at 21, relying on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
320 Id.
321 Id.; See also 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12) (2004).
322 Id. at 22.
323 Id. 
324 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 23-4 (2000).
325 See 42 CFR §§ 498.3(b)(12), 498.1(a)-(b) (2004).
326 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 21 (2000).  
327 See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(h), 1395cc(h)(1), 1395ii (2004); 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2004); 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.153(b), 488.408(g)(2), 498.3(d)(10)(ii) (2004).  
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after following the special review route, to contest in court the 
lawfulness of any regulation or statute upon which an agency 
determination depends.328
The Council also challenged the regulatory procedures that prevented 
challenges to the level of nursing noncompliance or imposition of penalty.329
Because the Council brought this suit as a preemptory challenge to the regulations 
it was unable to provide specific facts to rebut the Secretary’s claims.  The Court 
noted, however, that even if in individual cases the process resulted in a denial of 
judicial review, the Bowen exception was based on preclusion of review for an 
entire industry rather than the hardship of just one individual.330  In cases in which 
the hardship was not industry wide, the Court deferred to the agency process 
because it provides the agency opportunity to “apply, interpret, or revise policies, 
regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by different 
individual courts applying ripeness and exhaustion exceptions on a case by case 
basis,” but the agency can waive steps in process to reach federal court or the 
court can waive those steps even when no hearing has been held.331
The Court’s decision in Il. Council limited the application of the Bowen
exception to section 405(h) to cases in which there was no agency hearing 
process.  Thus, because Medicare regulations mandated a hearing process for 
nursing homes challenging deficiencies, nursing homes had to present its case to 
HHS and receive a final agency ruling before submitting a case in federal court.  
Currently, HHS is not complying with the mandated hearing process of the 
Medicare regulations.  Specifically, the Secretary’s interpretation of the 
regulations that govern the nursing home hearing process, upon which the Court 
relied, was never adopted by the agency.332  Nursing homes do not have the right 
to appeal determinations of noncompliance unless a certain remedy is imposed.333
Moreover, nursing homes are not granted access to a full evidentiary hearing 
leaving nursing homes without the procedural due process rights that the Court 
relied upon in its ruling.  
V. THE REALITY OF NURSING HOME HEARINGS AFTER SHALALA:
A RIGHT TO NO MEANINGFUL REVIEW, THROUGH WRITTEN 
SUBMISSIONS
328 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. 1, 20 (2000).
329 Id. at 23.
330 Id. at 22.  Individual hardship is addressed by excusing steps in the channeling 
process once the individual has presented the case to the agency, which is nonwaivable 
and nonexcusable.  Id. at 22-23.
331 Id. at 24.
332 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.046 (2004).  
333 Id.
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The Secretary’s interpretations of the regulations in Ill. Council are 
contrary to what actually happens within the nursing home hearing process. 334
Hence, as the Council argued in Ill. Council, the prohibition of federal review of 
Constitutional challenges prior to presentment and final ruling by HHS amounts 
to the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review.”335  Nursing homes 
are prevented from receiving any evidentiary hearing unless HHS imposes 
appealable remedies or termination.  This directly contradicts the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the Medicare regulations offered in Ill. Council, upon which the 
Court relied in makings its decision to bar nursing homes from federal courts.336
Once a nursing home is granted a hearing, the hearing process is so limited that 
there is no meaningful review of claims.  The ALJs have begun to limit the 
hearing process to written direct testimony and in-person cross-examination.  This 
is contrary to the Medicare Act and regulations, the Congressional intent of the 
Medicare Act and regulations, and the rules of the APA § 554.
A. The Right to No Meaningful Review
In Ill. Council, the Secretary stated, “any ‘dissatisfied’ nursing home was 
entitled to review any determination that it failed to comply substantially with the 
statute, agreements, or regulations, whether termination or some other remedy 
was imposed.”337 Even though the Secretary offered a clear interpretation of 42 
C.F.R. § 498.3 in Ill. Council, the rest of HHS, including HHS counsel and ALJs, 
do not abide by this interpretation.  Beginning in 1996, four years prior to the 
ruling in Ill. Council and continuing through the present, HHS attorneys have 
filed Motions to Dismiss in nursing home cases where the remedy imposed has 
been rescinded but the allegations of noncompliance remain posted on the internet 
and within the nursing home’s compliance file for use in future inspections.338
334 ALJs summarily dismiss nursing home appeals in Medicare noncompliance 
cases when HHS has not imposed a remedy.  See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 
(1996), aff’d DAB No. 1607 (1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 
(1999); Heritage Manor of Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (2000); Lutheran Home –
Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza 
Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 (2000), aff’d DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge 
Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 (2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); 
Highlands at Brighton, DAB No. CR1104 (2003); Manorcare Health Services Sandia, 
DAB No. CR1255 (2004). 
335 See in Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 20 (2000), citing McNary, 498 U.S. 479, 497 
(1991).  
336 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 21 (2000).
337 Id.
338 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (1996), aff’d DAB No. 1607 
(1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (1999); Heritage Manor of 
Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (2000); Lutheran Home – Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 
(2000), aff’d DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 
(2000), aff’d DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 
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In six cases339 decided by ALJs where HHS did not impose remedies, the 
ALJ dismissed the cases reasoning that the nursing home did not have a right to a 
hearing under the regulations if no remedy was imposed. 340   For instance the first 
case decided by HHS on this issue was Arcadia Acres, Inc. v. HCFA.341  In 
Arcadia Acres, the facility challenged findings of noncompliance based on 
surveys conducted on November 21, 1995 and January 18, 1996.  HHS sent 
Arcadia Acres a latter on March 4, 1996 imposing the remedy of denial of 
payments for new admissions, which HHS rescinded on April 1, 1996.  Arcadia 
Acres timely filed its hearing request, but the ALJ granted HHS’ Motion to 
Dismiss.  HHS asserted that the 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12)342 of the Medicare 
regulations only provided a nursing home a right to a hearing once a remedy was 
imposed.  Arcadia Acres contended that HHS would use these noncompliance 
findings to determine the amount of penalties for future noncompliance findings.  
Arcadia Acres asked the ALJ to proceed “to a hearing on the findings of 
deficiencies in order to protect against ‘injustice’ resulting from unjust and 
inadequate survey results and because, ‘[i]f not in the instant appeal, where else 
will Arcadia Acres have a forum?’”343
To resolve the case, the ALJ referred to the Secretary’s response during 
the notice and comment period of 42 C.F.R. § 498.3(b)(12), which said: 
Comment: Several commenters wanted a right to appeal all 
deficiencies even if no remedy was imposed.
Response: We are not accepting this suggestion because if no 
remedy is imposed the provider has suffered no injury calling for 
appeal.
(emphasis added).344  Thus, the ALJ ruled in favor of HHS because when 
promulgating the compliance regulations the Secretary specifically rejected the 
claim that any dissatisfied nursing home had a right to appeal noncompliance 
findings unless a r emedy was imposed.  The ALJ further held that the possibility 
of HHS’ imposing sanctions against the facility in the future on the basis of its 
(2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB 
No. CR1104 (2003); Manorcare Health Services Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (2004). 
339 Id.
340
 42 C.F.R. § 488.3 (2004).
341 Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (1996), aff’d DAB No. 1607 (1997) (no 
internal page numbers available for citation).
342
 This section was redesignated as 498.3(b)(13) in 2000.  See 65 Fed. Reg. 
18549 (Apr. 7, 2000).  Only the imposition of certain remedies grants the nursing home 
appeal rights.  See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.3(b)(13), 488.406 (2004).
343 Id.
344 Id. citing 59 Fed. Reg. 56116; 56158 (Nov. 10, 1994).
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findings of noncompliance was speculative and outside any definition of “initial 
determination” entitling the facility to a hearing under 42 C.F.R. §§498.3(b)(13) 
& (d) and 488.330(e)(3).
Contrary to the ALJ’s holding in Arcadia Acres, this practice is not 
speculative and does cause nursing homes financial and reputation harm.  HHS 
does regularly use these unappealable findings of noncompliance that are not 
adjudicated for future actions as mandated by the federal regulations.345  In fact, 
according to 42 C.F.R. § 488.404, HHS is mandated to consider the nursing 
home’s history of noncompliance in determining which remedies to impose.346
Moreover, 42 C.F.R. § 488.438 requires HHS to consider a facility’s history of 
noncompliance and any repeat deficiencies when determining the amount of civil 
money penalty it will impose.347  Thus, HHS consistently penalizes a nursing 
home for these unappealable findings of noncompliance.  Not only does this 
contradict the Secretary’s statements in Ill. Council that nursing homes are 
afforded hearing rights regardless of whether a remedy is imposed, but it also 
contradicts the ALJ’s finding in Arcadia Acres, Inc. that nursing homes are 
afforded all rights of due process under the regulations.  This practice also 
prevents nursing homes from any meaningful review to challenge the alleged 
noncompliance findings that remain part of the public record of the nursing home.  
In reviewing the nursing homes case in Ill. Council, the Supreme Court 
focused on the fact that even if HHS’ administrative review process barred the 
claims of some the process was still meaningful because it did not bar an entire 
industry and served the objectives of the exhaustion doctrine: allowing the agency 
to apply, interpret, or revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly 
premature interference by different individual courts applying ripeness and 
exhaustion exceptions on a case by case basis.”348  The practice of HHS does bar 
the entire industry from obtaining review because no nursing home has the right 
to review if a remedy is not imposed.  Furthermore, because the nursing homes 
cases are summarily dismissed each time the objectives stated in Ill.Council are 
not meet.  There is no opportunity for Secretary to correct errors and no record is 
complied for the federal court because cases are summarily dismissed without any 
record.349  Furthermore, Constitutional arguments do not appear on the record 
345 42 C.F.R. §§ See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404(c)(2), 488.438(f)(1) and (3) (2004).  
See also Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR887 (2002).
346 Id.
347 Id.
348 Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 24 (2000).
349 See Arcadia Acres, Inc., DAB No. CR424 (1996), aff’d DAB No. 1607 
(1997); Jacinto City Healthcare Ctr., DAB No. CR627 (1999); Heritage Manor of 
Franklinton, DAB No. CR666 (2002); Lutheran Home – Caledonia, DAB No. CR 674 
(2000), aff’d DAB No. 1753 (2000); Lakewood Plaza Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR 691 
(2000), aff’d DAB No. 1767 (2001); Lakeland Lodge Nursing Ctr., DAB No. CR893 
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because ALJs either ignore arguments or dismiss them before the nursing home 
can preserve its arguments.350
Hence, the nursing home industry should be allowed to bring cases in 
federal court for review without having to present claims to HHS and receiving a 
final ruling from HHS, because just like the physicians in Bowen, the nursing 
home industry has been left without access to any meaningful review.  Even when 
nursing homes are afforded a hearing, the hearing process conducted is minimal at 
best.  In fact, the actual hearing process has been limited to the submission of all 
direct testimony through affidavits and in-person cross-examination.351  Although 
the current Medicare regulations that grant nursing homes procedural Due Process 
guarantee a right to a full evidentiary hearing on the record,352 ALJs of HHS have 
seemingly reverted back to the “informal hearing” process used by HHS in 1986, 
without any formal change in the rules.  
B. Full Evidentiary Hearings Through Written Submission 
Beginning in 2002, some of the eight ALJ’s decided to reconsider what 42 
C.F.R. Part 498 meant when it said a full and fair hearing must be conducted. 353
Three of the ALJs began to require that all direct testimony of witnesses be 
submitted through written submissions, only allowing the participants to cross-
examine witnesses at their full evidentiary hearing.354  The ALJ’s, employees of 
HHS, made this modification without issuing any new rulings, regulations, or 
policy memos justifying this change.  These changes are arbitrarily applied -- not 
all ALJs prevent in-court testimony -- and directly contradict the plain language 
of the statute and regulations governing nursing home hearings, are contrary to 
Congress’ intent when it created the full evidentiary hearing process, and violate 
the APA.355
1. Plain Language of Medicare Statute and Regulations. - Section 1320a-
7a(c)(2) of the Medicare Act mandates that nursing homes be granted:
(2002); Southwood Care Ctr., DAB No. CR1029 (2003); Highlands at Brighton, DAB 
No. CR1104 (2003); Manorcare Health Services Sandia, DAB No. CR1255 (2004).
350 Beverly Health & Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 223 F. Supp. 2d 73, 87 
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
351 See Judicial Order from ALJ Kessel regarding pre-hearing submissions. (on 
file with author).
352 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66 (2004).
353
 According to 42 C.F.R. Part 498, which governs the hearing process, in-
person witness testimony is a required element of the nursing home hearing.  Id.  In fact, 
the regulations state that witnesses will testify at the in-person hearing, without any 
mention that this testimony is limited to cross-examination.  Id.
354 See Judicial order from ALJ Kessel regarding pre-hearing submissions.  (On 
file with author).
355 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66 (2004).
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an opportunity for the determination to be made on the record after 
a hearing at which the person is entitled to be represented by 
counsel, to present witnesses and to cross-examine witnesses 
against the person.  
(emphasis added).356  This was further codified in the Medicare regulations.357
According to 42 C.F.R. § 498.60, the ALJ must inquire fully into all matters at 
issue and receive into evidence the testimony of witnesses and any documents that 
are relevant and material at the in-person hearing.358  Clearly, this means that 
witnesses are required to present their entire testimony at the in-person hearing, 
because the regulation does not distinguish between direct or cross examination of 
witnesses.  This regulation further states that the ALJ decides the order in which 
the evidence and the arguments of the parties are presented and the conduct of the 
hearing.359  Although, ALJs may decide the conduct of the hearing, this authority 
is limited by 42 C.F.R. § 498.62, which governs witness’s testimony.360  The 
regulation states: 
The representative of each party is permitted to examine his or her 
own witnesses subject to interrogation by the representative of the 
other party.  The ALJ may ask any questions that he or she deems 
necessary. The ALJ rules upon any objection made by either party 
as to the propriety of any question.   
(emphasis added).361  Therefore, according to 42 C.F.R. §498.62, a witness’ entire 
testimony shall be given at the in-person hearing so that the ALJ may ask 
questions and rule upon objections.  
Furthermore, if direct testimony is in the form of an affidavit, the ALJ will 
not be able to ask timely questions regarding the witnesses’ testimony which may 
serve to clarify some disputed issues of material fact.  Also, the questions asked of 
witnesses never appear in their affidavit.  Therefore, the opportunity for parties to 
make objections “to the propriety of any question” as required by 42 C.F.R. 
§498.62 is non-existent.  Instead of being granted the opportunity to keep 
inadmissible statements out of evidence, parties are limited to filing broad 
motions to strike witness statements, requiring the ALJ to review the statement 
and then determine its admissibility.  Moreover, the submission of direct 
testimony through affidavits violates the requirements of 42 C.F.R. §498.66. 
356
 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(c)(2) (2004).
357 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60, 498.62, 498.66 (2004).
358
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.60.
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 See 42 C.F.R. § 498.62.
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According to 42 C.F.R. §498.66, a party must file a written waiver of the 
right to appear and present evidence to waive its right to an oral hearing.362  In 
fact, 42 C.F.R. §498.66 states that an oral hearing must be conducted unless “an 
affected party wishes to waive its right to appear and present evidence at the 
hearing,” by filing “a written waiver with the ALJ.”363  Even when a nursing 
home has not submitted a written waiver of its right to appear and present 
evidence, ALJs are implementing these policies.  This contravenes the plain 
meaning of the regulation, because in these cases there has been no admission of 
fact by either party; thus, the ALJ must conduct an oral hearing because it is 
“necessary to clarify the facts at issue.”364  Furthermore, some ALJs intentionally 
disregard the legislative and agency history behind the creation of a formal 
agency hearing process when they fail to grant a full evidentiary hearing.
2. Congressional and Agency Intent. – In 1986, nursing homes were only 
granted limited procedural due process rights to challenge the intermediate 
sanction365 of denial of payments for new Medicare admissions.366  However, in 
1987, Congress abolished this informal hearing process and granted nursing 
homes to a formal hearing.367  .  In 1995, HHS implemented these changes and 
promulgated new hearing regulations, re-structuring the hearing process to 
include the right to a full evidentiary hearing before an ALJ if there were genuine 
issues of material fact in dispute.368  These rights included witnesses testifying at 
hearing.369  Therefore, it is clear from these changes HHS intended to give 
nursing homes a full evidentiary for both termination and remedies.370
Additionally, when the nursing home hearing process is compared to the hearing 
process of laboratories, it is clear that HHS intended to grant nursing homes the 
right to a full evidentiary hearing.  
One of the main purposes of granting nursing homes the right to a hearing 
was to afford them the right to effectively challenge HHS’ findings of 
noncompliance.371  Furthermore, when HHS wanted to limit an agency’s hearing 
process it was quite clear. For example, when HHS created a hearing process for 
362




 Additional intermediate sanctions, now entitled remedies, were added to the 
federal regulations.  For further discussion supra Section II.A.3.  
366
 51 Fed. Reg. 24484, 24491 (July 3, 1986).
367 H.R. REP. NO. 100-391 at 470 (2d Sess. 1987).  HHS combined the formal 
hearing for termination and the informal hearing for other remedies into one hearing 
process.  See 52 Fed. Reg. 22444, 22447-22448 (June 12, 1987).  
368
 60 Fed. Reg. 50118 (Sept. 28, 1995).
369
 42 C.F.R. § 498.62 (2004).
370
 52 Fed. Reg. at 22444-22445.
371 See 52 Fed. Reg. at 22447.  
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laboratories under the Clinical Improvement Amendments of 1988 (“CLIA”)372
codified in Subpart D of 42 C.F.R. Part 488, HHS specifically limited the rights of 
laboratories.373  According to 42 C.F.R. § 488.201, a laboratory dissatisfied with 
HHS’ determination has a right to seek reconsideration regardless of whether a 
remedy has been imposed.374  CLIA laboratories are given an informal hearing in 
front of a hearing officer.375  In addition, laboratories are allowed to present 
witness testimony at the hearing.376  Although laboratories are afforded these 
rights, this process is only minimal compared to nursing home hearings.
First, the process for laboratories is entitled “informal hearing”377 while 
the process for nursing homes is called a “hearing.”378  Second, the hearing 
process for laboratories is conducted in front of a hearing officer,379 while nursing 
homes have the right to present evidence to an ALJ.380  Furthermore, laboratories 
are limited to who can be witnesses and participants in the informal hearing,381
whereas, nursing home are granted the unlimited option of bringing to the hearing 
anyone whose “presence the ALJ considers necessary or proper.”382  Hence, when
HHS wanted to limit the due process rights afforded in a hearing it stated so 
clearly in the regulations governing laboratories.  Notwithstanding these facts, 
some ALJs have rejected this change in the regulations some seventeen years later 
by requiring nursing homes to submit direct testimony through affidavits reverting 
back to an “informal hearing” process.  HHS did not state that nursing homes 
were only entitled to an informal hearing, so nursing homes are entitled to a full 
evidentiary hearing.  Furthermore, once Congress and HHS provided nursing 
homes with a hearing on the record, APA §554 requires that nursing homes be 
granted a full evidentiary hearing.
372
 On October 31 1988, the Clinical Improvement Amendments of 1988 
(“CLIA”) was enacted to revise the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967.  CLIA 
made every laboratory in the country that tests human specimens for health reasons 
subject to federal regulation regardless of whether it participated in a government 
program or its tested specimens in interstate commerce.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 33992 (July 
31, 1992).
373 See 42 C.F.R. §488.201 (2004).
374 See 42 C.F.R. §488.201 (2004).
375 Id.
376
 42 C.F.R. § 488.205 (2004).
377 Id.
378 See 42 C.F.R. § 498.40 (2004).
379 See 42 C.F.R. § 488.207 (2004).
380 See 42 C.F.R. § 498.5 (2004).
381
 The witnesses are limited to authorized representatives, technical advisors, 
and a legal counsel.  See 42 C.F.R. § 488.207(b)(1).
382
 42 C.F.R. § 498.60 (2004).
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3. The Administrative Procedure Act. – Section 554 of the APA provides 
that:
every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on 
the record after opportunity of an agency hearing.383
(emphasis added).  Before the section 554 of the APA can apply, the statute must 
clearly mandate a hearing on the record.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has “also 
implied that formal adjudication procedures are only necessary when a statue uses 
the magic words ‘on the record’.”384  Thus, HHS is required to provide nursing 
homes a right to a hearing if the Medicare statute provides a hearing on the 
record.  This proposition was recently affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit in the case styled, Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson.385
In Crestview, a skilled nursing home located in Ohio was surveyed by the 
Ohio Department of Health on August 29, 1999, and found out of compliance 
with the Medicare regulations.386  The Ohio Department of Health revisited the 
facility four times before finding the facility in compliance on October 21, 
1999.387  HHS imposed a $400 a day civil money penalty from October 2nd to 
October 21st.388  Crestview appealed the imposition of the $400 a day civil money 
penalty challenging the facts supporting the penalty to an ALJ on December 30, 
1999.  Crestview and HHS participated in a pre-hearing conference with the ALJ 
on September 10, 2001.389  Subsequently, the parties exchanged pre-hearing 
briefs.  On December 12, 2001, the ALJ informed the parties that the case would 
be resolved without an in-person hearing because there were no genuine issues of 
material fact.390  The ALJ ruled in favor of HHS, finding that the $400 civil 
money penalty and the DAB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling.391  Crestview appealed 
the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.  
The Court ruled that nursing homes had a right to an in-person hearing based 
on APA § 554 and the Medicare statute and regulations.392  The Court held that 
APA § 554 provided a right to an in-person hearing if the statute required the 
383
 APA, 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1994).
384 Crestview Parke Care Ctr. v. Thompson, 373 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2004), 
relying on PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654-55 (1990) (affirming agency’s use of 
informal hearing process without an oral hearing because statute did not require the 
hearing to be on the record).
385 Crestview Parke, 373 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2004).
386 Id. at 744.
387 Id. at 745.
388 Id.
389 Id.
390 Id. at 746.
391 Id.
392 Id. at 748.
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agency to grant an opportunity to be heard on the record.393  Because section 
1320a-7a(c)(2) of the Social Security Act guaranteed nursing homes the right to a 
hearing on the record with in-person witness testimony, the Court held that 
Crestview was entitled to an in-person hearing.394  Even with this ruling, some 
ALJs still limit the hearing to in-person cross-examination.395
Nursing homes have no right to a hearing to challenge any finding of 
noncompliance and even when granted a hearing there is no meaningful review 
because some ALJs are limiting the formal hearing process to written direct 
testimony and in-person cross-examination.  HHS reasons that without the 
imposition of the remedy, nursing homes are not harmed.  However, this is not the 
case.  HHS is required under 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(g)(5) to report their findings to 
the public by posting it on their website.  This is harm to the nursing home’s 
reputation.  Additionally, HHS is required under 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.404 and 
488.438 to take into consideration the compliance history of the facility, which 
includes these unreviewable findings of noncompliance.  This causes nursing 
home’s financial harm.  
When a nursing home actually gains access to the hearing process some ALJS 
have limited the hearing process to in-person cross-examination directly 
contradicting the plain language of the Medicare Act and regulations, the intent of 
the Medicare Act and regulations, and the APA.  Thus, when the Supreme Court 
ruled in Ill. Council that nursing homes were prohibited by 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) 
and (h) from seeking federal court review unless the nursing home presented that 
case to HHS and received a final ruling, the Court effectively barred nursing 
homes from any meaningful review.  To resolve these issues nursing homes could 
file a lawsuit with proof that the hearing process is meaningless or HHS could 
comply with the Medicare regulations.
C. Solutions 
To preserve fairness and Due Process in Medicare compliance hearings, 
HHS should return to providing nursing homes with a full evidentiary hearing that 
includes witness testimony.  To ensure timely resolution of cases to protect the 
lives of nursing home residents and permit nursing homes an opportunity to 
protect their financial interests and reputation, HHS should also hire more ALJS 
to hear cases.  If a nursing home is not afforded a hearing, then HHS should post 
the facility’s hearing request on their website along with their alleged non-
compliance findings.  
393
 Id.
394 Id. at 748.  The court further noted that the Medicare regulations 42 C.F.R. §§
498.3(a)(1), 488.330(e)(3(ii), 498.60-62, 498.66 clearly provided nursing homes the right 
to an in person hearing.  Id. at 749.  For further discussion of these regulatory 
requirements supra Section V.B.1.
395 See Judicial Order from ALJ Kessel regarding pre-hearing findings (on file 
with author).
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Finally, HHS should automatically waive the finality requirement for 
Constitutional challenges so that nursing homes can immediately enter federal 
court.  This would allow HHS to save time and money bypassing menial debates 
concerning compliance when the nursing home is only challenging the 
Constitutionality of the procedures used.  The implementation of these solutions 
would not entail any additional expense and would actually improve the system 
for the benefit of the nursing homes as well as the residents.  The timely 
resolution of nursing home compliance hearings ensures that instead of wasting 
time on fight allegations of noncompliance the nursing home can focus on the 
quality of residents.  
CONCLUSION
The failure of Federal administrative agencies to provide the Due Process 
rights guaranteed by the agency’s governing statute, regulations, and policy 
statements contravenes the protections guaranteed by the Due Process Clause: the 
fundamental right of Americans regulated by the federal government to receive 
due process of law when deprived of life, liberty, or property.  HHS’ limitation of 
nursing homes’ hearing rights is one example of this contravention.  
Understandably, the money spent by HHS justifies rigorous regulation of nursing 
homes to ensure that residents receive quality care.  However, arbitrary and 
capricious regulation of nursing homes that leaves them without any avenue to 
challenge the agency’s actions violates the procedural Due Process rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.  The Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Ill. Council upholding the bar to federal review until 
presentment to HHS and a final agency ruling, even if the claims are 
Constitutional in nature, created a fundamental flaw in the nursing home hearing 
process.  Nursing homes cannot obtain agency review for certain claims and thus 
are barred from federal review, yet these unreviewable claims are then used 
against them in later proceedings.396
This abrogation of rights has pushed the industry to near collapse, because 
not only do alleged violations of Medicare regulations serve as the basis for 
Medicaid actions,397 but these findings are also used by insurance companies in 
determining yearly insurance premiums for nursing homes.398  Therefore, 
396
 42 C.F.R. §§ 498.5, 498.60-66 (2004).
397 See 77 Ill. ADMIN. CODE §§ 300.200 (e)(1), (f) (2002).  See generally, Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (g)(1)(A) (1994).
398
 Currently in many states such as Texas, Florida and Illinois there is an 
insurance crisis for nursing homes.  Many nursing homes are forced to operate without 
insurance because insurance companies are unwilling to offer nursing homes with less 
than perfect compliance histories reasonable insurance rates.  See Kendall Anderson, 
Nursing homes pay premium to survive: Soaring liability costs blamed for closure of 
nonprofit care centers, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 25, 2002 at 21A.  Liability 
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procedural due process rights,399 or lack thereof, afforded nursing homes during 
hearings to challenge alleged violations of the Medicare regulations are 
paramount to a nursing home’s continued operation.  To comply with the 
Medicare statute and regulations, HHS should provide nursing homes with timely 
full evidentiary hearings and allow facilities with Constitutional challenges that 
the agency has no authority to decide proceed to federal court.  By putting these 
solutions into place, HHS can streamline the process so that cases are quickly and 
fairly resolved, while still protecting the care provided nursing home residents.
insurance rates, tied to litigation costs and the quality of care, have increased on average 
1,000 percent since 1998.  Id.
399
 Procedural due process rights are an integral part of a full and fair hearing in 
federal and state courts.  See APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554 and 556 (1994).  See also FINAL 
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 7 
(1941), contained in S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong. (1st Sess. 1941).
